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THE DYNAMICS AND DETERMINANTS OF THE
DECISION TO GRANT EN BANC REVIEW
Tracey E. George*
Abstract: The ability of U.S. Courts of Appeals to control the development of law within
their respective circuits has been strained by the practice of divisional sittings, the growing
caseload at the circuit court level, the increasing number of judges sitting within each circuit,
and the decreasing probability of Supreme Court intervention. The primary method of
maintaining coherence and consistency in doctrinal development within a federal circuit is en
bane review. Yet, many critics contend that en bane rehearing is a time-consuming, inefficient
procedure that fails to serve its intended purpose and too often is abused for political ends.
This Article attempts to address these normative arguments over the legitimacy of the en bane
process by determining the positive causes of the decision. The Article proposes a hybrid
model of the decision to grant en bane review, derived from the legal, attitudinal, and
hierarchical theories of judicial behavior, and tests it empirically against nearly 1000 cases
from three circuits. The model accurately predicts the decision to grant en bane review in
nearly ninety percent of the cases. This Article concludes that three factors-reversal of a
lower court or agency ruling, filing of a dissent, and a liberal panel ruling-largely account
for which panel decisions will be reheard en bane.
The U.S. Courts of Appeals, which effectively have become the courts
of last resort for most litigants and the source of doctrinal development
for most legal issues,' decide the vast majority of cases by way of panels.
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Grossman, Chris Guthrie, Valerie Hoekstra, Bruce Kobayashi, Bob Lawless, Leandra Lederman,
Ronald Mann, Lynn Mather, Adam Pritchard, Bob Pushaw, Jeff Raehlinski, Michael Solimine,
Maxwell Steams, Steve Wasby, and Chris Wells for their thoughtful feedback and guidance. My
thanks also to participants in a faculty workshop at George Mason University School of Law for
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Supreme Court certiorari decisions by Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., The Dynamics and Determinants of
Agenda Change in the Rehnquist Court, in Contemplating Courts 251 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
1. In the 1996-1997 term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 101 cases, compared to the more than
25,000 cases decided by the U.S. Courts of Appeals; fewer than 4% of the parties who sought a
definitive ruling from the Court by way of a writ of certiorari were able to obtain it. The Supreme
Court's 1996 Term, IIl Harv. L. Rev. 51, 435-36 (1997) (reporting Supreme Court figures); 1997
U.S. Jud. Conf. Ann. Rep. Table B-1 (reporting court of appeals figures). As can be seen by
comparing these figures, the actual rate of Supreme Court review of lower court rulings is in fact
lower than its rate of certiorari grants, as petitions seeking certiorari are filed from only a fraction of
circuit court decisions. A study of three circuits estimated that the rate of Supreme Court review of
circuit court holdings is only .5%. See Sue Davis & Donald R. Songer, The Changing Role of the
United States Courts of Appeals: The Flow of Litigation Revisited, 13 Just. Sys. J. 323, 335 (1988-
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Acceptance of the panel practice is in part a product of the availability of
review of selected panel rulings by the court's full membership, termed
"en banc" review.' At the behest of a judge or a party and with the
concurrence of a majority of the circuit's active membership, all active
members of the court, as well as any senior judge from the circuit who
was a member of the original panel, will sit to decide an appeal en banc.
The en banc court's ruling becomes the circuit's decision in the case, and
the court vacates any earlier panel decision. Circuit courts rarely invoke
the en banc procedure; courts of appeals resolve fewer than one percent
of their cases en banc.
5
89); see also J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System: A Study of
the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits xvii, 9-10, 23-56 (1981) (examining role of
circuit courts of appeals "[a]s courts of last resort in the vast majority of federal cases, and as
primary organs of judicial review of federal administrative agencies"); Donald R. Songer, The
Circuit Courts ofAppeals, in The American Courts: A Critical Assessment 35 (John B. Gates &
Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (discussing methodology and implications of Songer's work with
Davis).
2. This Article deals solely with en bane rehearings by U.S. Courts of Appeals of general
jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit also has en bane power. Fed. R. App. P. 35. Federal district courts
have also heard cases en bane, although very rarely. John R. Bartels, United States District Courts
En Banc-Resolving the Ambiguities, 73 Judicature 40, 40 (1989) (identifying en bane hearings in 38
reported decisions and nine unpublished decisions from 1928-1989). State supreme courts that
normally sit in divisions also retain the en bane hearing option, as do some state intermediate
appellate courts and at least one state trial court. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador et al., Appellate Courts:
Structures, Functions, Processes, and Personnel 397-98 (1994) (discussing varying approaches at
intermediate level); A. Lamar Alexander, Jr., Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of
Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (pt. 1), 40 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 563, 566-67
(1965) (explaining that state supreme courts that normally sit in divisions continue to review certain
matters as entire body); John J. Connolly, Comment, Maryland's Right ofin Banc Review, 51 Md. L.
Rev. 434 (1992) (describing Maryland's constitutional right to en bane review at trial court level).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994); Fed. R. App. P. 35.
4. See, e.g., 1st Cir. R. Int. Op. P. X(D); 4th Cir. R. 35(c); 5th Cir. R. 41.3; 6th Cir. R. 14(a); 10th
Cir. R. 35.6; 1 1th Cir. R. 35-11.
5. The extremely low relative number of en bane decisions has been observed in studies focusing
on different periods spanning the life of the intermediate appellate system. See, e.g., Sheldon
Goldman & Tom Jahnige, The Federal Courts as a Political System 23 (3d ed. 1985) (observing that
use of en bane procedure is "rare"); Howard, supra note 1, at 42, 193 (reporting that en bane cases
comprise fewer than one percent of all cases from 1965-1967); Richard A. Posner, The Federal
Courts: Challenge and Reform 133-34 (1996) (reporting that only 78 en bane decisions were
rendered out of more than 25,000 decisions on merits in 1993); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior
on the United States Courts ofAppeals Revisited, 69 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 491, 493 n.7 (1975) (finding
that en bane cases amounted to less than 1% of circuit caseload from 1965-1971); Michael E.
Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 29, 46 (1988) (reporting for 1980-1987
period that approximately .5% of caseload of courts of appeals were en bane decisions); Alexander,
supra note 2, at 564, 608 (finding that only 423 cases were decided en bane by all circuits from
1940-1964 and that 1.5% of decisions rendered in 1964 were en bane).
En Banc Review
In 1995, the Fourth Circuit decided to rehear en banc eleven panel
rulings,6 including the unremarkable case of Hardester v. Lincoln
National Life Insurance Co.7 In Hardester, the court resolved a dispute
over the meaning of a pre-existing duty clause in a health insurance
policy. The Hardester decision turned on the proper interpretation of the
policy's language, a heavily fact-laden inquiry with limited relevance to
other disputes. Yet, in the same year it reheard such a relatively minor
case, the Fourth Circuit refused to rehear en bane O'Connor v,
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,8 a case in which the panel relied upon
an interpretation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act that
contradicted the approach taken by every other circuit save one.' The
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to O'Connor and unanimously
reversed the Fourth Circuit.1"
The Fourth Circuit also refused to grant en banc rehearing to another
dispute that eventually was argued before the Supreme Court and was the
subject of widespread publicity. In United States v. Virginia, the Justice
6. Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 62 F.3d 659 (4th Cir. 1995), on reh'g en bane, 84
F.3d 672 (4th Cir. 1996); Robinson v. Shell Oil, No. 83-1562, 1995 WL 25831 (4th Cir. Jan. 18,
1995), on reh'g en banc, 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 519 U.S. 337 (1997); Gilliam v. Foster,
61 F.3d 1070 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (recounting votes and decision in unpublished and
unavailable panel ruling); Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 94-1323, 1995 WL 25643, (4th Cir.
Jan. 8, 1995), on reh'g en banc, 74 F.3d 1473 (4th Cir. 1996); Chesapeake B & M, Inc. v. Harford
County, 58 F.3d 1005 (4th Cir. 1995) (en bane); Nasim v. Warden, 42 F.3d 1472 (4th Cir.), on reh g
en banc, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hines, 39 F.3d 74 (4th Cir. 1994), on reh 'g en
banc, 65 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated, 516 U.S. 1156 (1996); United States v. Langley, No. 93-
5219, 1994 WL 518394 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1994), on reh'g en banc, 62 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1995);
Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 1994), on reh'g en banc, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir. 1995);
Hardester v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 1994), on reh'g en banc, 52 F.3d 70
(4th Cir. 1995); 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 32 F.3d 109 (4th Cir. 1994),
on reh "g en banc, 58 F.3d 988 (4th Cir. 1995).
7. 33 F.3d 330.
8. 56 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff who asserts that he was fired because of his
age must have been replaced by worker who is under 40, and thus not within protected class, in order
to state prima faie case of age discrimination), rev'd, 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
9. See Rinehart v. City of Independence, 35 F.3d 1263, 1265-66 (8th Cir. 1994); Kralmad v.
Illinois Dep't of Veterans' Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 153-56 (7th Cir. 1994); Carter v. City of Miami,
870 F.2d 578, 582-83 (11th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1335 n.2
(1st Cir. 1988); Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1506 (5th Cir. 1988); Cooper
v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1988); Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766
F.2d 788, 792-93 (3d Cir. 1985); Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 1984); Cuddy
v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531-33 (9th
Cir. 1981). But see LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1993)
(requiring plaintiff to show that replacement was person outside protected age group).
10. See 517 U.S. 308.
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Department challenged the Virginia Military Institute's (VMI) refusal to
admit women." Seventeen interest groups filed amicus curiae briefs in
the Fourth Circuit on the side of the federal government urging the panel
to reverse the district court's ruling that a single-gender educational
system such as that found at VMI does not offend the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution. 2 The panel refused. 3 The Department of
Justice sought full court review, but the Fourth Circuit voted to deny
rehearing en banc. 14 In the same year, the Fourth Circuit granted a party's
motion for en banc rehearing of an unpublished panel decision reversing
the grant of summary judgment in a civil antitrust suit. 5 It may seem
counter-intuitive that the Fourth Circuit decided to rehear a minor
contract interpretation case such as Hardester but not O'Connor, a case
involving a significant intercircuit conflict, and refused to grant rehearing
en banc to the highly publicized VMI case, United States v. Virginia,
while granting rehearing to a civil suit of no particular note.
Surprisingly little is known about why circuit courts select certain
cases for en banc rehearing. While a number of judges, scholars, and
other court observers have considered whether courts should use the en
banc procedure, "6 few have considered why it is used.' 7 Yet, understanding
11. 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 946 (1993), on remand, 852 F. Supp.
471 (1994), aff'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). The Supreme Court did
not grant review to the first Fourth Circuit VMI ruling, but rather to the second. However, the
Supreme Court's decision addressed the legal conclusions initially reached by the first Fourth Circuit
decision, namely that gender differences justify separate educational programs, which were
unchanged by the second circuit decision.
12. Id. at 890-91.
13. Id. at 899-900. The panel concluded that "(1) single-gender education, and VMI's program in
particular, is justified by a legitimate and relevant institutional mission which favors neither sex;
[and) (2) the introduction of women at VMI will materially alter the very program in which women
seek to partake." Id. at 899. However, the court concluded that Virginia had not presented arguments
to justify the absence of a "VMI-type" education for women. Id. Therefore, the panel remanded the
case to the district court to require Virginia's creation and implementation of a "parallel" program
open to women. Id. at 900.
14. Id. (reporting vote on suggestion for rehearing en banc on Nov. 19, 1992).
15. M & M Med. Supplies & Serv., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp., Inc., No. 90-3100, 1991 WL
211859 (4th Cir. Oct. 22, 1991), on reh 'g en banc, 981 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1992).
16. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542, 582-83 (1969) (arguing that en
banc process is inefficient and unwise); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc:
1981-1990, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1008 (1991) (examining costs and benefits of en banc procedure
and utilizing descriptive data to consider legitimacy of different rationales); Irving R. Kaufman, Do
the Costs of the En Banc Proceeding Outweigh Its Advantages?, 69 Judicature 7, 7 (1985) (arguing
from his experience as Second Circuit judge that "the negative aspects associated with en banc far
surpass its purported benefits"); Neil D. McFeeley, En Banc Proceedings in the United States Courts
Vol. 74:213, 1999
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the decision to grant en banc review is important because en banc cases
are arguably the most significant cases decided by the courts of appeals.
The en banc case is of greater consequence than the more common
panel case for a number of reasons. Most obviously, the en banc hearing
procedure limits the cases reviewed by the entire court to those selected
by a majority of the court's members. This procedure creates the
presumption that the cases are likely to involve difficult, complex, highly
political, or at least important legal questions.18 The en banc case poses
of.Appeals, 24 Idaho L. Rev. 255, 255 (1987-88) (proposing procedural reforms to reduce number of
"frivolous" suggestions for en bane consideration); Jon 0. Newman, Foreword: In Banc Practice in
the Second Circuit, 1989-93, 60 Brook. L. Rev. 491 (1994); Jon 0. Newman, Foreword: In Banc
Practice in the Second Circuit, 1984-1988, 55 Brook. L. Rev. 355 (1989); Jon 0. Newman,
Foreword: In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit: The Yirtues of Restraint, 50 Brook. L. Rev. 365
(1984) (explaining, in series of three articles, value of Second Circuit's relatively few en bane
rehearings); Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for Increasing the
Use ofEn Banc Appellate Review, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 805, 807 (1993) (arguing for increased use of
procedure to achieve greater doctrinal uniformity, reduce dominance of court by minority of its
members, and decrease need for Supreme Court intervention); Alexander, supra note 2, (pts. 1 & 2)
at 563, 726 (presenting exhaustive and highly critical detailing of en bane review); Note, The
Politics of En Banc Review, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 864 (1989) (criticizing what author judges to be
increased ideological use of en bane procedure); Note, En Banc Review in Federal Circuit Courts: A
Reassessment, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 1637, 1649 (1974) (examining effectiveness of en bane procedure
as tool for ensuring uniformity and authority in circuit court rules).
For a general discussion and review of the critical accounts, see Stein, supra, at 806-07, 829-52
(examining arguments that en bane process leads to numerous disadvantages such as "judicial
inefficiency, diminished finality of three-judge panel decisions[,] impairment of collegiality within a
circuit[,]" and politicization of appellate process).
17. Arthur Hellman considered the relationship between intracircuit conflicts and the decision to
grant en bane review. Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of
Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 541 (1990). Hellman systematically
examined the Ninth Circuit papers to determine the role of the en bane procedure in maintaining
consistency in the law of the circuit. He reviewed all intra-court memoranda regarding en bane
review between 1981 and 1986 and found that "en bane ballots were rarely requested and even more
rarely successful.... [and] contributed only minimally to preservation of uniformity in the law of
the Ninth Circuit." Id. at 548-50.
Michael Solimine examined empirically claims that the en bane procedure has become politicized
by Reagan appointees. Solimine, supra note 5, at 33. Combining normative and positive perspectives
on the en bane procedure, Solimine evaluated a three-term sample of en bane decisions against a set
of criteria for appropriate purposes for en bane review. He concluded that the criticisms of Reagan
judges for ideological abuse of the en bane mechanism were unfounded. Id. at 45-51; see also
Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 16, at 1027-31 (examining legal issues prompting en bane
consideration), 1036-39 (comparing votes and participation in en bane and panel decisions).
18. Deborah J. Barrow & Thomas G. Walker, A Court Divided: The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Politics of Judicial Reform 5 & nn. 1-12 (1988) (observing that "[ain en bane
session is considered an extraordinary procedure, generally reserved for particularly important or
novel legal questions"); Burton M. Atkins, Decisionmaking Rules and Judicial Strategy on the
United States Courts of Appeals, 25 W. Pol. Q. 626, 638 (1972) (explaining that "[e]n bane sessions
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larger consequences because it expends greater judicial and litigant
resources, 19 exposes the parties and circuit to the possibility of a
splintered ruling,2 and removes some of the standard constraints on
judicial decisionmaking at the court of appeals level.2
By granting rehearing en banc, a court may seek to speak in a single
voice; however, the result is not necessarily harmonious. A circuit
court's ability to sit en banc may work to protect the integrity of circuit
law and to reinforce institutional legitimacy by ensuring consistency and
conformity in decisionmaking. Yet, the appearance of the full court
regularly reviewing and often reversing decisions by panels may
undermine a basic tenet of our intermediate appellate system: three-judge
panels representing and acting on behalf of the whole court. In addition
to the material costs22 such as delay, judicial inefficiency, administrative
expense, and attorneys' fees, seeking one voice can produce the opposite
effect by causing intracourt acrimony, ideological polarization, and lost
collegiality.23
are reserved for issues of significance and controversy.... Cases heard en bane may be considered
more analogous to those considered by the Supreme Court in that they raise controversial issues and
therefore tap, and more accurately reflect, the basic ideological disagreements within the court.");
Christopher E. Smith, Polarization and Change in the Federal Courts: En Bane Decisions in the
U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 74 Judicature 133, 134 (1990) (utilizing en banc cases as subject of his study
in part because such cases are more significant).
19. See infra note 22.
20. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 16, at 8 (detailing examples of en banc cases that produced "a
litany of diverging opinions"); Solimine, supra note 5, at 38 (presenting, as part of "functional
critique" of en banc process, criticism that it "results in fragmented opinions of dubious precedential
value").
21. For example, the en banc court, unlike a panel, can overturn circuit precedent. Cf Ginsburg &
Falk, supra note 16, at 1050 (predicting, based on their experiences as D.C. Circuit judge and clerk,
respectively, that "[t]he D.C. Circuit's en banc practice will always be controversial within the court
and among the Bar... because the stakes are high whenever the court decides to rehear a case en
bane").
22. See, e.g., Steven Bennett & Christine Pembroke, "Mini" In Bane Proceedings: A Survey of
Circuit Practices, 34 Clev. St. L. Rev. 531, 543 (1986); Carrington, supra note 16, at 582-83
(discussing how process is "time-consuming for the judiciary and burdensome to litigants");
Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 16, at 1018-20; Kaufman, supra note 16, at 7 (arguing "that the en
banc proceding is the most time consuming and inefficient device in the appellate judiciary's
repertoire"); Solimine, supra note 5, at 37-44 (surveying "the criticism[s] of the en banc process
that its costs far outweigh its benefits"); Peter Michael Madden, Comment, In Bane Procedures in
the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 401,417-18 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 1, at 217 (observing from his interviews with judges of Second,
Fifth, and D.C. Circuits that "[t]he [en band] procedure can intensify conflict and polarize courts");
Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 22, at 543-44; Carrington, supra note 16, at 583; Ginsburg & Falk,
supra note 16, at 1021; Kaufman, supra note 16, at 8; Douglas 0. Linder, How Judges Judge: A
Study of Disagreement on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 38 Ark. L. Rev.
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This Article proposes, tests, and considers the implications of a hybrid
theory of the decision to grant en bane review. The theory is "hybrid"
because it is composed of seven separate hypotheses derived from
existing positive theories of judicial decisionmaking in the resolution of
cases on the merits. The Article tests the theory by comparing all panel
decisions reheard24 en bane by three circuits' (305 cases) to a random
sample of panel decisions from those circuits that the court did not rehear
en bane (610 cases).26 The model accurately predicts whether the circuit
479,487 (1985) (noting from interviews with Eighth Circuit judges that "[tfwo judges suggested that
en bane cases more frequently generate 'bad feelings' than do panel cases.... [which t]hey
attributed... not to the language contained in en bane dissents, but rather to the dynamics of the
decisionmaking process in en bane cases"); Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit, 1984-
1988, supra note 16, at 369 (arguing from circuit judge's vantage point that "frequent use of the in
bane practice surely poses a threat to [collegiality]"); Solimine, supra note 5, at 39 (citing as
weakness of en bane process possibility that en bane decisionmaking would lead to "acrimony
among concurring and dissenting judges"); Stephen Wermiel, Reagan and the Courts: Full-Court
Review of Panel Rulings Becomes Tool Oten Used by Reagan Judges Aiming to Mold Law, Wall St.
J., Mar. 22, 1988, available in 1988 WL-WSJ 475907 (quoting D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Patricia
Wald's contention that en bane review "heighten[s] tensions" among judges). But see Albert
Branson Mars, Hearing and Rehearing Cases In Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91, 96-97 (1954) (representing
that his Third Circuit colleagues "think that [the en bane] procedure has been very helpful in
maintaining the very high esprit de corps which they enjoy"); Solimine, supra note 5, at 40 (arguing
that "[e]specially when cases are 'important', the participation of all the judges may contribute to
institutional harmony by permitting the entire court to participate"); Stephen L. Wasby,
Communication in the Ninth Circuit: A Concern for Collegiality, 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 73, 108
(1987) (concluding, based on interviews with Ninth Circuit judges, that most consider en bane
process to be "healthy conflict in an exchange of views"); Mich. L. Rev. Note, supra note 16, at
1649, 1651 & n.67 (observing, based on circuit judges' survey responses, that "[i]nstitutional
harmony may be advanced by permitting judges to participate in important cases about which they
have strong feelings" but concluding that this alone would not justify en bane rehearing).
24. I do not include in this evaluation cases heard as an initial matter en bane because my analysis
involves a comparison of the underlying panel decisions to panel decisions that were not reheard en
bane.
25. The three circuits are the Second Circuit, which includes Connecticut, New York, and
Vermont; the Fourth Circuit, which covers Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and
West Virginia; and the Eighth Circuit, which governs Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
26. I do not limit my study to those cases in which a party filed a suggestion for en bane rehearing
for several reasons. First, the suggestions are not publicly available. Second, Hellman's research
indicates that litigant request is not the primary mechanism for rehearing en bane, but rather
suggestion by ajudge more often accounts for the decision. Third, even the fact that no one-litigant
or judge-asked for reconsideration is reflective of the very dynamics and determinants that I seek
to uncover. Finally, there is some evidence that suggestions for en bane reconsideration, although
"disfavored" by the Federal Rules, are made in a substantial portion of cases. See, e.g., Delmar
Karlen, Appellate Courts in the United States and England 55 (1963) (reporting that petitions for
rehearing were filed in about half of Second Circuit's cases and that petitions often requested en
bane rehearing); John C. Godbold, The Eleventh Circuit Court ofAppeals-The First Ten Years, 43
Mercer L. Rev. 961, 974 (1992) (estimating that suggestions were filed in approximately 5000 cases
219
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court will rehear a panel decision in nearly ninety percent of the cases.
Three factors in particular-reversal of a lower court or agency ruling,
filing of a dissent by a panelist, and a liberal ruling-largely account for
which panel decisions will be reheard en banc. Factors typically assumed
to be relevant, such as the composition of the panel and an intercircuit
conflict, did not have a measurable impact on the decision.
Part I of this Article begins with a brief consideration of the origin and
history of the courts of appeals, the adoption of divisional sittings, and
the introduction of the en banc procedure. Part II considers three
dominant theories of judicial decisionmaking at the intermediate
appellate level-legal, attitudinal, and hierarchical-and delineates
hypotheses with respect to each theory about the determinants and
dynamics of the decision to grant en banc review. Part III presents an
integrated model27 of judicial decisionmaking in the en banc process and
tests this model against a substantial dataset (nearly 1000 cases). Part IV
concludes by considering the practical implications of the empirical
results for litigants, the normative implications for the judiciary, and the
positive implications for judicial process scholars.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COURTS OF APPEALS AND
EN BANC REVIEW
One can better understand the dynamics of the en banc process by first
looking at the development of the procedure. The explanation for the
creation and use of the en banc procedure begins with an account of the
courts of appeals adopting a practice of sitting in divisions rather than as
an entire court.2" The history ends with the debate over whether courts of
during the 1 th Circuit's first decade (1981-1990)); McFeeley, supra note 16, at 268-69 (reporting
that suggestions were filed in approximately 17% of D.C. Circuit disposed cases in 1985 and in
approximately 8% of Ninth Circuit cases from 1981-1985).
27. The term "model," as used here and throughout this Article, connotes explanatory models:
those that seek to describe and explain phenomena. A good model will explain a sizeable percentage,
although not all, of the observed behavior and thereby serve as a valuable aid to our understanding of
that behavior. See generally Lee Epstein, Studying Law and Courts, in Contemplating Courts 1, 7-8
(Lee Epstein ed., 1995) ("[M]odels in social science are not meant to constitute reality. To the
contrary, they are purposefully designed to ignore certain aspects of the real world and focus instead
on a crucial set of explanatory factors.... When we try to make generalizations about a
phenomena-say, judicial decision making-we lose the specifics that are part of reality .... Yet,
the simplifications inherent in models provide social scientists with useful handles for understanding
the real world and for reaching general conclusions about the way the world works.").
28. A detailed and complete account of the evolution of the courts of appeals may be found in
various sources. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court
Vol. 74:213, 1999
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appeals, having adopted the practice of sitting in panels of three judges,
had the power to convene as a whole to decide selected cases, and if so,
when they could do so.
A. Three-Judge Panels
Many court of appeals procedures, including hearing cases in three-
judge panels, cani be traced to the procedures of the courts that preceded
them. Congress created the predecessors to the U.S. Courts of Appeals-
the old "circuit courts"--along with the Supreme Court and the district
courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789.29 Congress provided that the circuit
courts would sit in three-judge panels" but did not create judgeships for
the circuit courts.3' Instead, three judges drawn from other federal
courts32 visited each of the courts in one region in a particular sequence,
traveling on horseback and "riding circuit."'33 The Judiciary Act of 1869
(1927); Jeffrey B. Morris, Federal Justice in the Second Circuit: A History of the United States
Courts in New York Connecticut, & Vermont, 1787-1987 (1987); Roscoe Pound, Organization of
Courts 103-09, 194-240 (1940); Richard J. Richardson & Kenneth N. Vines, The Politics of
Federal Courts: Lower Courts in the United States ch. 2 (1970); Russell R. Wheeler & Cynthia
Harrison, Creating the Federal Judicial System (1994).
29. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat 73. The original circuits were the eastern,
middle, and southern. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74; see also Pound, supra note 28, at 103-05.
30. § 4, 1 Stat at 74-75 (providing that circuit court "shall consist of any two justices of the
Supreme Court, and the district judge of such districts, any two of whom shall constitute a quorum").
31. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System
28-29 (4th ed. 1996). In 1800, a lame duck Federalist Congress authorized three circuit judgeships
for each of five circuits and one for the sixth in the infamous Law of the Midnight Judges, Act of
Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, and Federalists were named to all of the new judgeships. Fallon et
al., supra, at 34; Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 28, at 21 & n.56 (listing appointments); I Charles
Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 193 (rev. ed. 1926) (reporting newly elected
President Thomas Jefferson's view that Federalists created circuit judgeships to ensure that federal
courts would serve as Federalist "stronghold" from which to attack the works of Jefferson's
government). The newly elected Jeffersonians, shortly after taking control of Congress, abolished
the judgeships. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132 (repealing judiciary acts of preceding
Congress). See generally Fallon et al., supra, at 34; Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 28, at 25-28.
32. Originally, two judges were drawn from the Supreme Court and one from a district court
within the circuit's jurisdiction. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74-75 (prescribing that
two Supreme Court Justices and one district judge would comprise circuit bench). Later, one Justice
and one or two district judges were drawn. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333, 333
(providing that only one Justice was required for circuit court sessions).
33. Fallon et al., supra note 31, at 28-29; Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 28, at 21-23; Morris,
supra note 28, at 18-19. Historian and legal scholar Wythe Holt has concluded, based on the
historical record, that Congress "[s]taftted] the circuit courts with Supreme Court justices both [to]
save[] money and assure[] the proponents of a strong judiciary that the most important judges would
sit in the trial of the cases involving alienage and diversity" that fell within the circuit courts'
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created one separate circuit court judgeship for each of the then-existing
nine judicial circuits.34 This circuit judge sat with two judges drawn from
district courts in the circuit, and occasionally a justice from the Supreme
Court would sit in for either the circuit judge or a district judge.35 Thus,
the old circuit court panels never had a distinct identity because the
judges sitting on the panels changed from session to session.36
The circuit courts also lacked a distinct realm of judicial authority.
They served along with the district courts as trial courts in diversity of
citizenship cases and in criminal matters.37 Although granted limited
power to review district court decisions in large civil suits,38 the old
jurisdiction. Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 Duke L.J. 1421, 1488-89. Historian Charles Warren has
explained that the justices' circuit service also served as a form of public promotion for the new
federal judicial branch because the justices met individuals in different parts of the nation during
their travels. Warren, supra note 31, at 58. But, the justices bitterly complained about the onerous
burden of circuit riding and fought to end it. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme
Court 9, 32 (Elder Witt ed., 1979) (recounting various complaints including physical hardships of
long, uncomfortable, and occasionally dangerous travel and unpleasant accommodations and legal
questions posed by Supreme Court review of circuit cases involving justices); see also 1 Julius
Goebel, Jr., The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 554-69 (1971) (detailing Supreme Court's "revolt against
circuit riding").
34. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44, 45 (providing "[that for each of the nine
existing judicial circuits there shall be appointed a circuit judge, who shall reside in his circuit, and
shall possess the same power and jurisdiction therein as the justice of the Supreme Court allotted to
the circuit"); see also Fallon et al., supra note 31, at 34, 36 (explaining that Reconstruction Congress
established circuit judgeships in response to "surge in federal judicial business"); Frankfurter &
Landis, supra note 28, at 73-76 (detailing legislative compromises producing 1869 Act).
35. § 2, 16 Stat. at 45 (providing that any two of these judges-Supreme Court justice or circuit or
district judges-would constitute quorum of circuit court and that judges could sit apart to try cases);
see also, e.g., Pound, supra note 28, at 197.
36. Cf Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 68-69 (3d Cir. 1940) (en banc),
aff'd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941) (observing that circuit courts of appeals lacked permanent membership
and were staffed by judges drawn from other courts).
37. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77, 78-79. See generally Fallon et al.,
supra note 31, at 29-31 (detailing circuit and district courts' substantive jurisdictional boundaries);
Pound, supra note 28, at 104-05 (describing authority of district and circuit courts). The circuit
courts held exclusive jurisdiction over substantial criminal offenses but shared authority with the
district courts over lesser criminal offenses (that is, those offenses for which the punishment did not
exceed a whipping of "thirty stripes," a $100 fine, or a six-month prison term). §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. at
76-77, 78-79. The circuit courts had concurrent jurisdiction with district courts and state courts over
civil cases where the dispute exceeded $500. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78.
38. §§ 21, 22, 1 Stat. at 83, 84. Parties in admiralty cases involving disputes in excess of $300
could appeal district court rulings to the circuit court. § 21, 1 Stat. at 83. Losing parties in civil
actions where the sum in dispute exceeded $50 could seek circuit court review of a district court
decree if they satisfied certain procedural requirements. § 22, 1 Stat. at 84.
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circuit courts rarely exercised their appellate authority, primarily
deciding cases within their original jurisdiction. 9 As Felix Frankfurter
and James Landis observed, the first Judiciary Act contained "not a
trace... of a suggestion" of an appellate tribunal interposed between the
district courts and the Supreme Court.4"
The Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, popularly known as the
Evarts Act,4 ' inaugurated intermediate appellate courts in the federal
judicial system. The circuit courts of appeals42 created by the Evarts Act
resembled the old circuit courts in many respects: the new and old courts
shared the same geographic boundaries,43 circuit judges sat on both
courts,4' three-judge panels heard disputes,45 and visiting judges from
district courts and the Supreme Court sat on panels.46 The courts
continued to rely upon visiting judges to decide cases because the
circuits either lacked a permanent third judge4 or carried a heavy
39. Fallon et al., supra note 31, at 29 (explaining that circuit courts had "authority to review on
writ of error final decisions of the district courts in civil cases in which the matter in controversy
exceeded $50, and, on appeal, final decrees in admiralty and maritime cases in which the matter in
controversy exceeded $300"); Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 28, at 12-13 (proffering, based on
available data, that volume of appellate cases in circuit courts was not substantial and that "[tjhe
district and circuit courts were in practice two nisi prius courts"); Congressional Quarterly, supra
note 33, at 31, 264 (explaining that "[flor the nation's first century, the Supreme Court was
essentially the only body to hear appeals from the decisions of other federal courts").
40. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 28, at 13.
41. Cb. 517, §§ 2-3, 26 Stat. 826, 826-27 (1891). The act's popular name was that of its sponsor,
Senator William Evarts of New York. For a history of the events leading up to the adoption of the
Evarts Act, see Fallon et al., supra note 31, at 33-37, and Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 28, at
86-102.
42. Federal intermediate appellate courts were called "circuit courts of appeals" until 1948 when
their name was changed to "courts of appeals." Judicial Code of 1948, § 43(a), 62 Stat. 869, 870.
The title of the head circuit judge was also changed from "senior circuit judge" to "chief judge."
§ 45(a), 62 Stat. at 871.
43. § 2,26 Stat. at 826 (creating circuit court of appeals in each existing circuit).
44. § 3, 26 Stat. at 827 (providing that circuit judges within circuit were competent to sit on
circuit court of appeals for that circuit).
45. § 2, 26 Stat. at 826 (providing that court would "consist of three judges, of whom two shall
constitute a quorum").
46. § 3, 26 Stat. at 827 (providing that Supreme Court justices assigned to circuit and district
judges within circuit were competent to sit on circuit court of appeals for that circuit).
47. The Evarts Act added one more circuit judge to each circuit, increasing the number on each to
two, § 1, 26 Stat. at 826, except for the Second Circuit, which had previously received an additional
judgeship, Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 347,24 Stat. 492, and now had three, Fallon et al., supra note 31,
at 37.
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caseload.4" The significant feature distinguishing the circuit courts of
appeals from the circuit courts was that the new courts held only
appellate power, hearing appeals from both the district and circuit
courts.4 9 The circuit courts no longer heard any appeals, because the
Evarts Act stripped them of their limited appellate authority."
In 1911, Congress took the last step toward establishing the modem
intermediate appellate system when it abolished the old circuit courts and
retained the circuit courts of appeals created by the Evarts Act.5' The
circuit judges now became judges of the circuit courts of appeals. 2 The
1911 statute, like the Evarts Act, provided that the circuit courts of
appeals would "consist of three judges;"53 but, in the Second, Seventh,
and Eighth Circuits, Congress provided for four permanent judgeships
without clarifying whether the "court" in those circuits consisted of all
the judges or only three. 4 These three circuits continued to decide cases
in three-judge panels and did not sit as four judges for any matters.5
Given the history of the alternating composition of the original circuit
courts and the new circuit courts of appeals, it now seems inevitable that
the courts sat in panels of three with designated judges as necessary.56 As
48. The Second Circuit had three circuit judges but still regularly invited district judges to sit on
panels, probably because it was the busiest circuit. Morris, supra note 28, at 91, 94-95.
49. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828. See generally Pound, supra note 28, at 198-99 (discussing jurisdictional
authority of circuit courts of appeals).
50. § 4, 26 Stat. at 827. See generally Fallon et al., supra note 31, at 37 n.66 (explaining that "[i]n
deference to the traditionalists, the [Evarts] Act did not abolish the old circuit courts, although it took
away their appellate jurisdiction over the district courts").
51. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 297, 36 Stat. 1087, 1168.
52. To clear up some confusion over the exact status of the circuit judges appointed prior to the
Judicial Code of 1911, Congress passed the Act of Jan. 13, 1912, ch. 9, 37 Stat. 52, which expressly
provided that "[t]he circuit judges in each circuit shall be judges of the circuit court of appeals in that
circuit." See also Commissoner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1940) (en
banc) (reviewing legislative history of Act of 1912), aff'd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
53. Ch. 6, § 117, 36 Stat. at 1131 ("There shall be in each circuit a circuit court of appeals, which
shall consist of three judges, of whom two shall constitute a quorum, and which shall be a court of
record, with appellate jurisdiction, as hereinafter limited and established.").
54. Alexander, supra note 2, at 570.
55. See id. at 570-71.
56. The possibility that the new courts of appeals would sit in divisions had historical precedent as
well. The British Parliment, in the English Judicature Act of 1875, authorized the Court of Appeal of
England, ordinarily composed of the Mater of the Rolls and five Lords Justices, to hear appeals
simultaneously in two divisions of three, thereby doubling the court's decisionmaking capacity. One
division heard appeals primarily from the King's Bench; the other heard appeals from the Chancery
Division of the High Court. Pound, supra note 28, at 165. By 1963, the court's 12 judges were
sitting simultaneously in four panels of three each. Karlen, supra note 26, at 140 (observing that
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the membership of other circuits grew to more than three judges, those
courts also assumed the practice of panel hearings without adopting a
procedure for the full membership to sit together to hear cases.57 The
increased number of judgeships in the courts of appeals, combined with
the practice of simultaneous divisional sittings, expanded each court's
decisionmaking capacity and concomitantly its potential impact on the
development of the law.
B. Increased Authority and Influence
The Evarts Act, in addition to establishing a three-tiered judicial
system, introduced another major innovation: the writ of certiorari.5 The
Supreme Court now held the prerogative to refuse to hear certain
appeals. 9 Thus, the Act laid the groundwork for regional dominion in the
new circuit courts of appeals by establishing their unique jurisdiction,
assigning additional judges to the circuits, and allowing the Supreme
Court to defer to their decisions. Initially, however, the courts of appeals
were limited largely to the task of error review, as "[t]he institutional
generally, England's "appellate courts do not use their entire membership for the hearing of each
appeal, but sit in divisions"). Panels comprised of a subset ofjudges were also in place in state court
systems; however, the practice was received in some quarters with dissatisfaction. Pound, supra note
28, at 201-23 (relating historical development of divisional sittings on state courts of last resort);
Alexander, supra note 2, at 565-67 (observing that in 1879 California was first state to divide its
supreme court into two departments and that 20 of 28 states with large supreme courts had adopted
practice by 1930). Dean Roscoe Pound described divisional sittings as the most significant
nineteenth-century contribution toward solving organizational problems of courts of review. Pound,
supra note 28, at 223.
57. See, e.g., Karlen, supra note 26, at 141; Pound, supra note 28, at 201. Oddly, one court
scholar writing in 1929 stated unequivocally that "a single court sitting in divisions is, for practical
and geographical reasons, out of the question in the federal system." Walter F. Dodd, The Problems
ofAppellate Courts, 6 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 681, 689 (1929). This statement was made despite the fact
that in February 1929, four circuits had more than three judges and all were sitting in three-judge
panels. 29 F.2d v, v-ix (1929) (listing judges in circuit courts of appeals as of February 28, 1929).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, predecessor to the D.C. Circuit, did not initially
follow the practice of divisional sittings, instead sitting with all five judges when two judges joined
the court's original three in 1930. Alexander, supra note 2, at 571 n.60. The D.C. Circuit has a
unique history that accounts for this behavior. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 16, at 1010 & nn.12-13.
The five-judge sittings did not continue for long. By 1938, the court utilized three-judge panels. Id
58. Evarts Act, ch. 517, § 6,26 Stat. 826, 828 (1891).
59. The Evarts Act provided that the circuit courts of appeals decisions were final in nearly all
diversity, patent, revenue, non-capital criminal, and admiralty cases. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828. Parties
could only seek Supreme Court review by petitioning for a writ of certiorari, which was within the
Court's discretion to grant or deny. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828. Parties continued to have the right to appeal
to the Supreme Court in .cases involving jurisdictional issues, capital crimes, constitutional
questions, the construction of treaty law, or conflict of laws. § 5, 26 Stat. at 827-28.
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functions of appellate review-declaring and harmonizing general
principles-remained in the domain of the Supreme Court., 60
In the Judiciary Act of 1925 (the Judges Bill),6' Congress expanded
the courts of appeals' power by giving the Supreme Court even greater
discretionary control over its caseload.6" The Judges Bill thereby allowed
the courts of appeals to become the final arbiter in an increasing
proportion of federal cases.63 At the same time, the courts of appeals
quickly experienced unanticipated growth in their dockets.' This
unanticipated growth, combined with the Supreme Court's broader
discretion to refuse to hear appeals, increased the relative importance of
the courts of appeals.
65
60. Hellman, supra note 17, at 542; see also Paul D. Carrington et al., Justice on Appeal 200
(1976).
61. The act was popularly known as the Judges Bill because "the original legislation was drafted
by members of the Supreme Court." Congressional Quarterly, supra note 33, at 265; see also
Samuel Estreicher & John Sexton, Redefining the Supreme Court's Role: A Theory ofManaging the
Federal Judicial Process 12-13 (1986) (describing Justices' participation in judicial reform efforts
culminating in Judges Bill).
62. Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
63. See, e.g., Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 28, at 280-94, 299 (detailing scope and
implications of Act of 1925, which "cut the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to the bone"); William
Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction ofthe Supreme Court Under the Act ofFebruary 13, 1925, 35 Yale
L.J. 1, 2-3 (1925). Chief Justice Taft was one of the primary movers behind the Judges Bill, having
started the reform efforts when he was still President. Congressional Quarterly, supra note 33, at
265. Taft believed "that litigants have their rights sufficiently protected by a hearing or trial in the
courts of first instance, and by one review in an intermediate appellate Federal court." Taft, supra,
at 2.
64. The growth in the courts of appeals dockets can be seen by comparing the number of cases
filed after the Evarts Act with the number filed after the Judges Bill. Only 841 cases were filed in the
courts of appeals in the first year they existed. Posner, supra note 5, at 55. By 1930, the courts
decided nearly 3000 cases. Federal Judicial Ctr., The Federal Appellate Judiciary in the 21st
Century 253 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989).
While the courts of appeals' caseload expanded, the Supreme Court's contracted. Prior to the
Evarts Act, the Supreme Court's docket in 1890 included 1816 cases, 636 of which were new filings.
Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, and Developments 71 (2d ed.
1996). In 1930, 726 cases were on the Court's docket, but it granted review to only 159. Id. at 80.
65. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, The Crisis in the Circuits and the Innovations of the
Browning Years, in Restructuring Justice: The Innovations ofthe Ninth Circuit and the Future ofthe
Federal Courts 3, 13 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (elucidating courts' continued growth "in
prestige and authority" after passage of Judges Bill of 1925).
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C. En Banc Review
As judicial membership and caseloads rapidly expanded following the
Judges Bill, the circuits lost some control over the substantial lawmaking
authority they had only recently realized.' The growing number of
panels and rulings sparked concern about the difficulty of maintaining a
reasonable uniformity of legal doctrine. 7 The increased size of the
deliberative body also led to a decrease in the power of the individual
judge. These forces prompted some judges to call for the right of a
majority of a circuit's judges to vote for rehearing of a case by the entire
circuit membership.68
The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit court to address the issue of
whether courts of appeals could sit en banc. 9 In Bank of America v.
Commissioner,7" a divided Ninth Circuit panel ruled on a question
regarding estate taxes. A year later, three different Ninth Circuit judges
in Lang's Estate v. Commissioner7 addressed the exact question
answered by the Bank of America panel, but disagreed with the earlier
decision. As the Lang's Estate panel explained its predicament: "[We]
were faced with the situation where the decision of two judges made a
precedent for the remaining five."72 The Lang's Estate panel concluded
that "no method of hearing or rehearing by a larger number" existed at
the circuit level to resolve the conflict between the panels and, rather
than overrule the Bank of America holding, asked the Supreme Court to
66. Cf id at 3-4 (discussing difficulties posed to appellate court function by growing caseloads
and observing that "horizontal" expansion on court may allow it to resolve more cases, but is likely
to reduce its control).
67. See, e.g., Marls, supra note 23, at 96-97. The courts of appeals faced a unique problem in
their treatment of circuit precedent as a consequence of panel sittings, namely whether a later panel
could overturn an earlier panel. Even if a circuit concluded only the Supreme Court could overturn
panel precedent, the potential for intracircuit conflicts remained as a consequence of mistaken or
intentional ignorance of relevant precedent.
68. The Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges (now called the Judicial Conference of the
United States) in 1938 called upon Congress to amend the Judicial Code to make clear that "the
majority of the circuit judges [had the right] to provide for a court of more than three judges when in
their opinion unusual circumstances make such action advisable." 1938 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 23.
69. Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir.), certifyng question to 304 U.S. 264
(1938).
70. 90 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1937).
71. 97 F.2d 867.
72. Id. at 869.
73. Id.
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give a definitive answer to the estate law question.74 The Supreme Court,
while agreeing with the second panel on the substantive question, did not
address whether circuits could sit en banc.75
Two years later, the Third Circuit became the first circuit court to sit
en banc when its five judges heard arguments in Commissioner v. Textile
Mills Securities Corp. ,76 expressly disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit's
dicta in Lang's Estate that a circuit could not act as a full court.7 The
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Textile Mills to address the
circuit split.78 A unanimous Court agreed with the Third Circuit that the
"court" included all judges, not merely three.79 Hence, the larger group
had the inherent power to sit to decide cases, although a three-judge
panel was also permissible. Justice Douglas explained that "the result
reached makes for more effective judicial administration. Conflicts
within a circuit will be avoided. Finality of decision in the circuit courts
of appeals will be promoted."' He went on to point out that "[t]hose
considerations are especially important in view of the fact that in our
federal judicial system these courts are the courts of last resort in the run
of ordinary cases."'"
At the time of the Supreme Court's Textile Mills decision, a bill
authorizing circuits "to sit in banc... when in their opinion such action
is advisable" had passed in the House of Representatives and was being
74. Id. at 869-70.
75. Lang's Estate, 304 U.S. 264 (1938).
76. 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
77. Id. at 70-71 ("[W]e cannot agree with [Ninth Circuit] Judge Denman's contrary conclusion in
Lang's Estate .... We conclude that this court has power to provide, as it has done by [Local
Circuit] Rule 4(1), for sessions of the court en banc, consisting of all the circuit judges of the circuit
in active service.").
78. Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 327 ("We granted the petition for certiorari because of the public
importance of [the question of whether a circuit court of appeals of more than three judges can
convene all the judges to hear a case] and the contrariety of the views of the court below.., and
judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit... as respects its solution.").
79. Id. at 333-35. At the time of the Court's Textile Mills ruling, eight circuits had more than
three judges: the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. 115 F.2d
vii, vii-xiii (1941) (listing judges sitting on each court of appeals as of February 1941). The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia also had more than three judges, but it was not yet part of the
circuit court of appeals system. See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 16, at 1010 n.12 (explaining that
D.C. Court of Appeals was slowly integrated into circuit court system beginning in 1942 and was
fully integrated by 1948).
80. Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 334-35 (citation omitted).
81. Id.
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considered by the Senate.82 Congress dropped the bill after the Supreme
Court's ruling in Textile Mills." However, in the next major act
governing the judicial branch, the Judicial Code of 1948, Congress
explicitly recognized the practice:
Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or
division of not more than three judges... unless a hearing or
rehearing before the court in bane is ordered by a majority of the
circuit judges of the circuit who are in active service. A court in
banc shall consist of all [active] circuit judges [of the circuit] .... 84
Although codifying the practice of en banc review, the legislation did not
resolve the question left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Textile
Mills: namely, what standards the courts should follow when determining
whether to rehear or hear initially an appeal en banc.
Four years later, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to develop
explicit guidelines for the en banc process. In Western Pacific Railroad
Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.,8  the losing party challenged the
circuit court's refusal to reconsider the case en banc. The Supreme Court
concluded that Congress did not intend to create a statutory right to en
banc review,86 but rather to ratify legislatively the Textile Mills decision
and recognize the power of courts of appeals to sit en banc.87 The Court
82. 87 Cong. Rec. 8117 (1941).
83. Id.; see also Western Pac. R.R Corp. v. Western Pac. 1R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 253 (1953)
(postulating that proposed amendment "died because this Court's decision in Textile Mills
intervened").
84. Judicial Code of 1948, § 46(c), 62 Stat. 869, 871 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)
(1994)). Congress has utilized the "in bane" spelling in statutes, although judges and legal scholars
have traditionally used the "en bane" spelling. For a colorful discussion of the relative merits of each
spelling, see Newman, The Virtues of Restraint, supra note 16, at 365 n.1, and Newman, In Banc
Practice in the Second Circuit, 1984-1988, supra note 16, at 355 n.1. Last year, the Supreme Court
suggested a stylistic change in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure-substituting "en bane" for
"in banc." Overhaul of Federal Appellate Rules, Other Rule Amendments Sent to Congress, 66
U.S.L.W. 2665 (May 5, 1998). Such a change would bring the Rule into usage consistent with case
law and scholarship. The April 24, 1998 proposal became permanent because Congress did not act to
the contrary by December I that year.
85. 345 U.S. 247.
86. Id. at 250 ("In our view, [28 U.S.C.] § 46(c) is not addressed to litigants. It is addressed to the
Court of Appeals. It is a grant of power. It vests in the court the power to order hearings en bane. It
goes no further.").
87. Id. at 250-51 ("The statute, enacted in 1948, is but a legislative ratification of Textile
Mills... a decision which went no further than to sustain the power of a Court of Appeals to order a
hearing en banc."); id. at 254 ("[Congress] was motivated by a dual purpose: to give express
recognition to the doctrine of Textile Mills, while at the same time securing the tradition of
three-judge courts against any further intrusion.!).
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deferred as a matter of deliberate policy to the lower courts' discretion in
weighing what factors supported the grant of full court review: "[T]he
court is left free to devise its own administrative machinery to provide
the means whereby a majority may order such a hearing.""8 The circuit
courts must publish their chosen procedures for requesting an en banc
hearing so that "litigants who appear before [a circuit court] understand
the practice-whatever it may be-whereby the court convenes itself en
bane."89 But, the Court concluded, a party could not challenge the circuit
court's decision to grant or deny a request for en banc hearing.9"
While the Western Pacific majority refused to provide any guidance to
the courts of appeals, Justice Frankfurter in concurrence sought to
distinguish the en bane function as primarily one for resolving
intracircuit conflict.91 Frankfurter cautioned against using the en banc
process in other cases unless they were "extraordinary in scale-either
because the amount involved is stupendous or because the issues are
intricate enough to invoke the pooled wisdom of the circuit."92 Even at
this early stage, a dissenting justice voiced concern over the risk of en
banc rehearing creating a "hybrid intermediate court" between the three-
judge panel and the Supreme Court resulting in "[d]elay, cost, and
uncertainty" for litigants.93
Following Frankfurter's lead, Congress ratified a Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure implementing the existing judicial and statutory
grants of power.94 The rule warns that en banc review is "not favored and
88. See id. at 250. An indication of the (nearly) unfettered nature of the courts' discretion to
determine whether to sit en banc is reflected in the simple nomenclature used for motions by parties
seeking en banc rehearing. While a motion for rehearing by the panel is a "petition," a motion for
rehearing by the full court is to be framed as a mere "suggestion." See Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)
(allowing party to "suggest the appropriateness of a hearing or rehearing in banc") (emphasis added);
cf Solimine, supra note 5, at 35 n.27 (observing that "a strict reading of rule 35 reveals that only
,suggestions' for rehearing en banc properly can be offered by litigants").
89. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. at 260-61.
90. Id. at 259.
91. Id. at 271 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The Supreme Court later ruled that it would not accept
certification to resolve an intracircuit conflict, reasoning that the circuits had the responsibility and
capability to maintain consistency by virtue of the en banc procedure. Wisniewski v. United States,
353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957).
92. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. at 270-71 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Frankfurter agreed with
the majority that the courts of appeals held the power to formulate any rules concerning the exercise
of the en banc power. Id. at 268 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 273-74 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("If I were to predict, I would guess that today's
decision will either be ignored or it will be regretted.").
94. Fed. R. App. P. 35.
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ordinarily will not be ordered except when (1) consideration by the full
court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or
(2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance."95
The most recent evolution in the en banc procedure occurred in 1978
when Congress authorized circuit courts consisting of more than fifteen
judges to delegate en banc authority to a subset of the full court-a mini
en banc hearing.96 Congress did not order large appellate courts to do so,
but again granted them considerable leeway in controlling the en banc
process.97 Three circuits presently have more than fifteen judges,98 but
only the Ninth Circuit, by far the largest circuit with twenty-eight active
judges, has exercised the mini en banc option.99
95. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). The language appears to be drawn from both Frankfurter's Western
Pacific concurrence and the Court's opinion in United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp.,
363 U.S. 685 (1960). The Court in American-Foreign Steamship observed that "[e]n bane courts are
the exception, not the rule" and should be "convened only when extraordinary circumstances exist
that call for authoritative consideration and decision by those charged with the administration and
development of the law of the circuit." Id. at 689.
96. Pub. L. No. 95486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1633, 1633 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)
(1994)).
97. The original Fifth Circuit refused to adopt this practice, and its division may have been
hastened by the unwieldiness of a 24-judge deliberative body. See Barrow & Walker, supra note 18,
at 230-37 (detailing events precipitating Fifth Circuit's division and identifying en bane hearings as
proverbial last straw); Godbold, supra note 26, at 962 (recalling, from his tenure as Fifth Circuit
judge, that shortly before circuit's division "the court sat en bane on fifteen cases with twenty-four
active judges participating .... [which] changed the views of those who had opposed division"); see
also H.R. Rep. No. 96-1390, at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4236,4238-49. The Fifth
Circuit convened en bane to hear arguments in six cases in January 1980. Barrow & Walker, supra
note 18, at 230 & n.29. Twenty-six judges sat on the Fifth Circuit at that time, but two did not
participate in the en bane rulings. Id. After the 24-judge en bane sittings, all judges of the Fifth
Circuit, previously divided on the question of splitting the court, signed a petition in May 1980
asking Congress to split the court. Id at 152 (reprinting original petition), 236 (describing process by
which unanimous petition was adopted by judges and presented to Congress). In October 1980,
President Jimmy Carter signed into law the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act. Pub.
L. No. 96-452,94 Stat. 1994 (1980).
98. Congress has authorized more than 15 judges for the Fifth (17), Sixth (16), and Ninth (28)
Circuits. 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1994).
99. The Ninth Circuit has fully implemented this approach. Under its rules, if a majority of active,
non-recused judges votes for en bane review:
The en bane court, for each case or group of related cases taken en bane, shall consist of the
Chief Judge of this circuit and 10 additional judges to be drawn by lot from the active judges of
the Court... Notwithstanding the provision herein for random drawing of names by lot, if a
judge is not drawn on any of three successive en bane courts, that judge's name shall be placed
automatically on the next en bane court. In appropriate cases, the Court may order a reheating
by the full court following a hearing or rehearing en bane.
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While Congress has ordered the courts of appeals to hear en banc
challenges to the constitutionality of certain statutes,"° Congress and the
Supreme Court generally have vested the courts of appeals with almost
unfettered discretion to decide how and when to exercise their en banc
power.'"' Indeed, the courts of appeals have more discretion over en banc
rehearing than any other court procedure or action, rendering the en banc
process a particularly fruitful area for the study of judicial decisionmaking.
II. THREE THEORIES OF COURT OF APPEALS
DECISIONMAKING
Judges vested with discretion base their decisions on a number of
factors. As political scientist James Gibson explains, "judges' decisions
are a function of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think
they ought to do, but constrained by what they perceive is feasible to
do."'0 2 Social scientists and legal scholars have developed theories
explaining the nature and role of these factors in judicial behavior.
Attitudinal theory strives to explain judicial decisionmaking by what
judges would prefer to do; legal theory states that judges decide on the
basis of what they think the law dictates; and hierarchical theory
rationalizes that judges make decisions based on what they understand is
9th Cir. R. 35-3; see also Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large
Circuit, in Restructuring Justice, supra note 65, at 55, 63-73 (discussing circuit's adoption and
implementation of limited en banc practice).
100. See Newman, The Virtues of Restraint, supra note 16, at 372 & n.43. For example, the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 provides:
[T]he [Federal Election] Commission, the national committee of any political party, or any
individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President may institute such actions in
the appropriate district court of the United States, including actions for declaratory judgment, as
may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of this Act. The district
court immediately shall certify all questions of constitutionality of this Act to the United States
court of appeals for the circuit involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc.
2 U.S.C. § 437(h) (1994); see, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 678 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (considering constitutional
challenge to Federal Election Campaign Act as required by Act).
101. Circuit courts have even questioned the authority of Congress to require them to hear cases
en banc in light of the history of the courts' significant discretionary control over both the procedure
of seeking en banc hearing and the decision to grant it. See, e.g., Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d
575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (addressing constitutionality of legislative veto provision in FTC
Improvements Act, as required by Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 21(f)(1), 94 Stat. 374, 395-96 (1980)).
102. James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of
Judicial Behavior, 5 Pol. Behav. 7, 9 (1983).
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feasible given the limits imposed by superiors. 3 Legal theory and
attitudinal theory represent the two entrenched positive theories of
judicial behavior, while hierarchical theory reflects newer insights to
judicial decisionmaking.
This Article applies these positive theories of judicial behavior to the
decision to grant en bane review. Each theory generates expectations
about the bases of the decision to grant en bane rehearing. These
expectations, or "hypotheses," predict a certain relationship between the
grant of en bane rehearing and different characteristics of the panel
decision. The combined hypotheses constitute an integrated model of the
en bane decisionmaking process.
A. Legal Theory
The traditional conception of judicial decisionmaking is best captured
by formalism, or Classical Legal Theory."° Classical Legal Theory
distinguishes judicial power from executive and legislative powers by its
lack of decisionmaking discretion."5 Judges are neutral and reasoned
decisionmakers who defer to rules to guide their decisions.' 6 In fact,
most judges believe they are classicists and go to great lengths to explain
their decisions by reference to existing law.0 7 And, while most legal
103. Cf. id. Providing a shorthand overview of the judicial behavior theories dominant at the time,
Gibson explained that "attitude theory pertains to what judges prefer to do, role theory to what they
think they ought to do, and a host of group-institution theories to what is feasible to do." Id.
104. See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 58 Ohio St. L.L 1635, 1642-43 (1998) (describing sources and development of formalism).
105. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 1, at 15 (observing that under classic model of judicial
function put forth by Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall, "judges do not make the law but
merely declare it; judges exercise neither political power nor personal will but merely judgment, a
process bridled by law and the discipline of a professional craft); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article lIs
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev.
447,476-79 (1994) (discussing Blackstone's discourse on "the axiom that ajudge's role was merely
to 'expound'-not 'make'-the law"); Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 Yale
L.J. 493, 495-97 (1996) (book review) (explaining that under classical legal theory, as espoused by
Harvard Law School's first dean, Christopher Columbus Langdell, "law should be formal, producing
outcomes by the application of rules to facts without any intervening exercise of discretion").
106. See Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 323, 324, 326-27 (1992) (explaining classical legal paradigm and proposing
decisionmaking model based on its premises).
107. Social scientists have not been immune to the fact that judges construct their rulings by
applying legal rules to case facts. They have successfully crafted "legal" or "fact-pattern" models of
judicial decisionmaking in several issue areas. See, e.g., id. (death penalty); Jeffrey A. Segal,
Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962-1981,
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scholars do not adopt wholesale the classical legal view, they do accept
the premise that judges make decisions primarily through consideration
of legal principles. 8 As legal scholar Frank Cross explains, "[c]lassic
unabashed formalism is no longer widely embraced. Nonetheless, its
fundamental claims retain much of their appeal.... [Llegal scholars
have implicitly accepted the use of precedent at face value."'0 9
The legal model, which presumes that "the reasons presented for
decisions... perform an authentically disciplining function that
constrains judges' decisionmaking,""' would explain the decision to
grant en bane review by reference to the reasons offered to justify en
bane rehearing and the rules governing the process. Supreme Court
decisions and federal statutory law set forth two express, but vague,
guidelines for when a court of appeals should grant en banc rehearing: to
resolve intracircuit conflict and to consider questions of great
importance."' The legal model would posit that these factors should
account, in large measure, for which panel decisions courts rehear en banc.
1. Resolving Intracircuit Conflict
In the first national decision (judicial or legislative) on the propriety of
en bane review, the Supreme Court ruled that courts of appeals have the
power to convene themselves en banc primarily to allow them to resolve
conflict within the circuit."' Consistent with that view, the Supreme
78 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 891 (1984) (Fourth Amendment searches); Jeffrey A. Segal & Cheryl D.
Reedy, The Supreme Court and Sex Discrimination, 41 W. Pol. Q. 553 (1988) (sex discrimination);
Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial
Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 963 (1992) (obscenity).
Cf generally Gibson, supra note 102, at 13-16 (discussing extensions of attitudinal model to
incorporate case facts or cues).
108. Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 251, 255-64 (1997) (delineating traditional legal
model of judicial decisionmaking and subsequent innovations in legal theory as found in law
schools).
109. Id. at 260.
110. Id. at 262.
111. Fed. R. App. P. 35; United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689 (1960);
Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 271 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
112. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 355 (1941) (citing as reason for en
banc procedure that "[c]onflicts within a circuit will be avoided"). As Justice Frankfurter explained
in a later decision, "resolving intracircuit conflicts is the primary function of en banc proceedings."
Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Rehearings en banc by these
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Court adopted the position in 1957 that it would no longer accept
certification of intracircuit conflicts."3 The Court reasoned that the courts
of appeals, now armed with the power of en bane reconsideration, had an
institutional responsibility for resolving internal conflicts and for
harmonizing circuit law." 4 Subsequently, in 1967 Congress created
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 (Rule 35), which explicitly
provides that decisional harmony is one of the two special circumstances
justifying en bane rehearing."' Thus, classical legal theory produces an
expectation that conflict between panel decisions would be one of the
few instances in which judges would vote for en bane rehearing." 6
2. Considering Intercircuit Conflict
Rule 35 expressly acknowledges one other situation supporting en
bane review: namely, "question[s] of exceptional importance,"' 7 but the
provision does little to clarify which cases present such questions.
Moreover, if the drafters intended to limit the use of en bane review, the
very wording of the rule frustrates that purpose."8 In fact, any competent
legal advocate can argue that her case involves such a question, so a
litigant's, or even a dissenting judge's, claim that a case should be
courts, which sit in panels, are to some extent necessary in order to resolve conflicts between panels.
This is the dominant concern.").
113. Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957).
114. Id. ("It is primarily the task of a Court of Appeals to reconcile its internal conflicts.").
115. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a).
116. Extending the idea that en bane hearings should be used to harmonize circuit law, the Eighth
Circuit has taken the position that in instances where a conflict arises between two contemporaneous
district court decisions, the court should join the appeals and hear them initially en bane "in order to
ensure consistent results and to clarify the law." United States v. Lacy, 586 F.2d 1258, 1260 (8th Cir.
1978) (en bane).
117. Fed. R App. P. 35(a). As Justice Frankfurter mused: "Hearings en bane may be a resort also
in cases extraordinary in scale-either because the amount involved is stupendous or because the
issues are intricate enough to invoke the pooled wisdom of the circuit." Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S.
at 270-71 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But, the Second Circuit has taken the position that the court
should not rehear en bane a case where it is probable given the case's "extraordinary consequence
that.., the Supreme Court will take [the] matter under its certiorari jurisdiction." Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1020 (2d Cir. 1973) (Kaufman, J., concurring in denial of petition for
rehearing en bane). Hence, the cases that are deemed the most important may not be appropriate for
en bane reconsideration on the Second Circuit.
118. As Fourth Circuit Judge J. Dickson Phillips observed: "There is enough flexibility built into
the very text of this rule-in the word 'ordinarily' and in the open-ended expression of 'exceptional
importance'-that it could not be claimed that the rule itself either compels or excludes rehearing en
bane in any case." Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899, 914 (4th Cir. 1983) (Phillips, J.,
dissenting).
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reheard en banc because it presents a significant legal issue would not
alone be enough to distinguish between panel decisions." 9
Judges and scholars have posited that cases centering on legal issues
that are the subject of express intercircuit conflicts can be considered to
involve such doctrinal import. 2 Justices have suggested in their opinions
that a circuit split may justify an en bane rehearing.' Furthermore, the
Court recently proposed, on the suggestion of the U.S. Judicial
Conference, amending the language of Rule 35 to provide explicitly that
an intercircuit dispute warrants en banc reconsideration. 22 The local
rules of the Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits already list intercircuit
conflict as one criterion for granting en banc rehearing. 21 Therefore, a
classical legal model of en banc review would posit that an entire court
would more likely rehear cases involving a point disputed by other circuits.
119. As D.C. Circuit Judge Douglas Ginsburg observed, "'[e]xceptional importance' is in the eye
of the beholder." Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 16, at 1022. Second Circuit Judge Jon Newman has
also employed that truism in the same context. Newman, The Virtues of Restraint, supra note 16,
at 371.
120. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Edwards, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (listing as reason to rehear en bane
resolution of potential conflict between D.C. Circuit and at least two other circuits); Hartman
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1327, 1330 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane) ("[W]e think it best to
clear up any confusion on the issue [presented in this case] that there may be in this circuit and to
align the Second Circuit with every other circuit which has confronted the question."); Ginsburg &
Falk, supra note 16, at 1024; Solimine, supra note 5, at 59-60 & n.170; cf Madden, supra note 22,
at 416-17 (arguing that en bane review may be appropriate where panel decision on "important or
divisive issue" is in conflict with decisions of other courts of appeals). But cf Posner, supra note 5,
at 381-82 (arguing that adoption of principle that circuit should rehear en bane any case producing
circuit split would waste resources and grant too much authority to first circuit to address issue).
121. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 170 (1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (questioning
Ninth Circuit's failure to grant en bane rehearing to panel's "departure from the rule followed in all
other circuits"); United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11-12 (1994) (unanimous) (explaining that
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflict between Ninth Circuit and other eleven circuits
and questioning why Ninth Circuit did not, as member of panel majority had requested, reconsider
circuit precedent en bane); Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 172 n.8 (1990) (unanimous)
("Given the panel's expressed doubt about the correctness of the Circuit precedent that it was
following, together with the fact that there was a square conflict in the Circuits, it might have been
appropriate for the panel to request a rehearing en bane.").
122. Overhaul of Federal Appellate Rules, Other Rule Amendments Sent to Congress, 66
U.S.L.W. 2665 (May 5, 1998); see also Judicial Conference Considering Numerous Rule Changes,
10(9) Inside Litig., Sept. 1996, at 7, 8. The April 24, 1998 proposal became the rule because
Congress did not act to the contrary by December 1, 1998. Thomas R. Newman & Steven J.
Ahmuty, Jr., Amendments to the Federal Rules, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 2, 1998, at 3.
123. 7th Cir. R. 35(b); 9th Cir. R. 35-1; D.C. Cir. R. 35(c).
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B. Attitudinal Theory
While most lawyers, judges, and legal scholars presume that judges
make decisions by examining relevant legal doctrine, most social
scientists adhere to the precept that judges make decisions based on their
ideological preferences. This perspective is best captured by the
attitudinal theory of judicial decisionmaking.'24 The attitudinal theory
assumes that judges are rational actors who, when making decisions,
seek to maximize their sincere policy preferences, termed "attitudes."'
' 2
Because most judges, in contrast to elected policymakers, have not
publicly disclosed their policy preferences, a proxy for attitudes is
necessary. 26 Attitudinal studies have demonstrated that the ideological
124. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold . Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
(1993) (presenting best statement and defense of attitudinal theory). See generally Cross, supra note
108, at 265-311 (examining and critiquing attitudinal model); George, supra note 104, at 1646-55
(discussing historical development and current articulation of attitudinal model); Gibson, supra note
102, at 9-13 (considering in detail evolution of attitudinal model ofjudicial decisionmaking).
125. Glendon Schubert, drawing on the work of social psychologists, was the first to propose a
model of judicial decisionmaking based on justices' attitudes. See Glendon Schubert, The Judicial
Mind: The Attitudes and ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946-1963 (1965). David Rohde and
Harold Spaeth expanded on Schubert's model with a construct of attitudes based on a set of
interrelated beliefs and further observed that goals, rules, and situations influence judicial behavior
generally. David W. Rohde & Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision Making (1976). For a
discussion of Schubert's and Rohde and Spaeth's work, see Segal & Spaeth, supra note 124, at 67-
69; Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Decision Making on the US. Courts ofAppeals, in Contemplating Courts,
supra note 27, at 227, 231-32; and Harold I. Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model, in Contemplating
Courts, supra note 27, at 296, 307.
126. Social scientists have utilized, successfully and unsuccessfully, a number of proxies for
appellate judges' attitudes. See generally George, supra note 104, at 1650-51 & nnA6-47
(detailing studies that "have sought to estimate unobservable personal values or ideology by relying
on observable attributes which have been linked with individual preferences and beliefs, such as age,
gender, race, party identification, and religious, regional, and ethnic background"); C. Neal Tate,
Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in
Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 355, 358-60 (1981)
(describing research using various personal attribute variables to attempt to predict Supreme Court
justice voting behavior).
Donald Songer, Jeffrey Segal, and Charles Cameron created a multidimensional attitude variable
based on a court of appeals judge's appointing President, region, prior prosecutorial or judicial
experience, and religion. Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-
Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 Am. I. Pol. Sci. 673, 679-80 (1994).
While their index of judicial ideology was successful in predicting voting behavior in search and
seizure rulings, I do not adopt it for several reasons. First, the significance of prior experience is
dependent on the issue area (the authors do not contend that the subject matter of their study-search
and seizure cases-is representative of caseloads generally). Second, my own work has found region
to be insignificant across issue areas. See George, supra note 104, at 1686. Third, aside from their
work, the empirical evidence on the effect of prior prosecutorial or judicial experience and religious
affiliation on courts of appeals decisions is limited to certain issue areas and the relationship between
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direction ("liberal" or "conservative") 127  of the party of a judge's
appointing President is a strong predictor of the case votes of Supreme
Court'28 and Court of Appeals judges. 29
these variables and judicial behavior is weak. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 5, at 497-505 (finding
that effect of religion, one-time political candidate, prior judicial experience, years on court, and
prosecutorial experience on judicial behavior on courts of appeals appeared negligible); Steven R.
Van Winkle, Dissent as a Signal: Evidence from the U.S. Courts of Appeals, at 13-14 (unpublished
paper, presented at 1997 annual meeting of American Political Science Association, Washington,
D.C.) (on file with author) (testing Songer, Segal, and Cameron measure of judicial ideology and
finding "that most of the characteristics were not significantly related to votes"); see also Tate,
supra, at 362 (finding that "religious affiliation adds little or nothing to the explicability" of
percentage of liberal votes cast by Supreme Court justice in civil rights and liberties cases). But see
Tate, supra, at 362-63 (finding relationship between prior experience and Supreme Court justices'
votes in civil liberties and rights and economic cases). Finally, I find the theoretical underpinnings
for these attributes to be less coherent and more post hoc than for the appointing President
characteristic and thus am disinclined to rely on them.
127. This Article uses the terms "liberal" and "conservative" in a way consistent with the
meanings traditionally assigned by social commentators and court scholars as well as most interested
observers of the legal system. Most Supreme Court watchers, for example, believe we can predict
with a fair amount of accuracy the vote of the Supreme Court's right wing-Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas-in many cases. We believe we can predict the right wing's
decisions because we share a common sense perception about how liberal and conservative judges
vote. For example, in the areas of civil rights and liberties, liberal judges generally seek to extend
those freedoms, conservatives to limit them. In the realm of economic regulation, liberal jurists favor
an enhanced governmental role and tend to uphold legislation that benefits working people or the
economic underdog, while conservatives oppose an increase in government intervention and tend to
favor business. In criminal cases, liberal judges generally are more sympathetic to defendants, while
conservatives tend to favor prosecution and law enforcement. The categorizations are admittedly
broad and cannot account for the complexity of relative ideological positions. Nevertheless, the
terms retain meaning and significance in the course of trying to understand political phenomena.
128. See, e.g., Stuart S. Nagel, The Legal Process from a Behavioral Perspective 193 (1969);
John D. Sprague, Voting Patterns ofthe United States Supreme Court: Cases in Federalism, 1889-
1959 (1968) (examining voting blocs using algorithm pairing justices who vote together); George &
Epstein, supra note 106, at 329-30 (finding that "the addition of Republican appointees enhanced
the Court's propensity toward a law-and-order stance"); Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation
and Judges' Decisions, 55 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 843 (1961); Tate, supra note 126, at 361-63 (demon-
strating that ideology of appointing President had strong influence on justices' decisions in civil
liberties and rights and economic cases).
129. See George, supra note 104, at 1678-86 (demonstrating that majority of Fourth Circuit
judges participating in en banc cases between 1962 and 1996 voted their sincere policy preferences
as measured by party of appointing President); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United
States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964, 60 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 374 (1966) (concluding, based on all
nonunanimous decisions and unanimous reversals by courts of appeals between 1961 and 1964, that
statistically significant relationship exists between party affiliation and voting behavior); Goldman,
supra note 5, at 494-95 (concluding based on intercorrelations of voting behavior on issues and
ideological voting blocs "that attitudes and values defined politically rather than legally may be of
prime importance in understanding appeals court voting behavior"); Robert Oliphant, En Banc
Polarization in the Eighth Circuit, 17 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 701, 706-07, 713-49 (1991) (finding
from "subjective analysis" of all en banc Eighth Circuit decisions issued in 1989 and 1990 terms that
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While these appellate court studies have focused primarily on
decisions on the merits, some Supreme Court studies suggest that
politically defined attitudes and politically motivated strategies account
for behavior in other steps in the judicial process, such as the decision to
grant certiorari. 30 The certiorari procedure resembles the en banc
procedure in several meaningful respects. Both require a significant
number of the court members' votes to hear a case.' As with the
Supreme Court, the full circuit court has sole discretion over the cases it
selects to hear en banc. The grant of certiorari places an issue on the
Supreme Court's highly selective agenda. Likewise, the grant of en banc
review elevates a case to one of the few worthy of full court
consideration. In light of these similarities, the decision to grant en banc
rehearing may reflect policy preferences in much the same way the
decision to grant certiorari does.
Attitudinalists recognize that judges must have some decisionmaking
discretion to be able to follow their personal preferences. 2 Hence,
"[e]ach judge's [appointing President's] political party's perspectives are reflected in [the judge's)
en banc decisions").
Judicature, a publication of the American Judicature Society focused on the improvement of the
judicial system, has regularly published thoughtful and concise empirical evaluations of the relative
ideological behavior of judges appointed by the then-sitting President. See, e.g., Robert A. Carp et
al., The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by President Bush, 76 Judicature 298 (1993); Jon
Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial
Revolution 70 Judicature 48, 54 (1986) (finding that Reagan appointees to circuit bench were more
conservative than Democratic appointees and comparably conservative when compared to Nixon
and Ford appointees); Ronald Stidham et al., The Voting Behavior of President Clinton's Judicial
Appointees, 80 Judicature 16, 17, 20 (1996) (finding that Clinton appointees were more liberal than
Republican appointees but less than Carter appointees).
130. See, e.g., H.W. Perry, Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme
Court (1991); Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests andAgenda Setting in the
U.S. Supreme Court, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1109, 1120-21 (1988); Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., The
Dynamics and Determinants of Agenda Change in the Rehnquist Court, in Contemplating Courts,
supra note 27, at 251, 251-53 (discussing research demonstrating that "[t]he factors that govern the
selection of cases and the construction of an annual agenda are closely tied to the factors that explain
the justices' decisions on the merits of cases"); cf Gibson, supra note 102, at 28 (arguing, based on
consideration of empirical evidence, that "the same factors that determine decisions on the merits
determine access decisions," such as grants of certiorari).
13 1. Certiorari requires only four out of nine judges, as opposed to the majority vote required for
en banc. David M. O'Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics 232-36 (2d ed.
1990) (explaining history and development of informal rule of four). The decision to grant en bane
review, then, would be more likely to reflect the ideological preferences of the court's majority than
the decision to grant certiorari.
132. For this reason, many studies of courts of appeals have considered only nonunanimous
decisions on the premise that such cases are more likely to provide some decisionmaking leeway for
the judge. See, e.g., Burton M. Atkins & Justin J. Green, Consensus on the United States Courts of
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attitudinal theory would be applicable to the en banc process only if it
were characterized by such discretion. Courts of appeals judges do, in
fact, have substantial discretion in the en bane process because the
process lacks many of the standard constraints on appellate court
decisionmaking 3 3 The en bane procedure is a highly discretionary
function characterized by an absence of tangible formal rules.134 Courts
of appeals rarely report publicly the judges' votes on en bane requests,
and judges need not provide written explanations for their decisions.
Further, the Supreme Court will not scrutinize grants or denials. 35 Thus,
judges have greater leeway to allow other factors, such as their policy
preferences, to influence their decisions on whether to vote for en banc
reconsideration.
Political scientists are not the only court watchers who believe that
judges make decisions to achieve political ends: a vocal group of
commentators has criticized the highly discretionary en banc power on
the grounds that judges often use their power to serve ideological
goals.'36 When Reagan judicial appointees gained majority control over a
Appeals: Illusion or Reality?, 20 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 735, 735 (1976) (observing that "the nonunan-
imous decision has, perhaps by default, emerged as the primary measure of conflict on appellate
courts"); Goldman, supra note 129, at 375 (examining only nonunanimous decisions and unanimous
reversals because "[s]uch cases indicate that there are alternative paths to decision"); cf Donald R.
Songer, Consensual and Nonconsensual Decisions in Unanimous Opinions of the United States
Courts of Appeals, 26 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 225, 225-27 (1982) (criticizing nearly exclusive reliance on
nonunanimous decisions in judicial behavior research). Likewise, studies of the Supreme Court have
emphasized that the nearly unfettered discretion of justices allows them to follow their policy
preferences. See, e.g., Rohde & Spaeth, supra note 125, at 72-74 (observing that ability of Supreme
Court justices to obtain their goals is aided by life tenure, which gives justices job security and
removes ambition for higher office, and by supremacy in judicial system, which accords finality to
their decisions).
133. Cf Segal et al., supra note 125, at 232 (observing that attitudinal model may have limited
relevance in context of court of appeals substantive decisions because those decisions are subject to
Supreme Court review, courts of appeals are unable to select which cases to decide, and circuit
judges may have ambition for higher office, which curtails their decisions in publicly announced
rulings).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Gori, 282 F.2d 43, 52 (2d Cir. 1960) (explaining that Second
Circuit has "kept formal rules to a minimum" in light of desire to allow for discretion in determining
whether to grant en bane review).
135. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250, 259-60, 267-68
(1953) (holding that en bane power is discretionary and that Supreme Court could only review lower
court en bane decisions to ensure circuits provide some administrative machinery for applying for en
bane rehearing).
136. Solimine, supra note 5, at 30-32, 37-38 (recounting claims that en bane procedure is used
for political reasons); Stein, supra note 16, at 845-46 (reviewing and challenging critics'
arguments); Note, Politics, supra note 16, at 866 (arguing that "the amorphous nature of the
exceptional importance standard apparently invites partisan decisionmaking"); Charley Roberts, In
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number of circuits in the '80s,' 37 critics alleged that the concurrent rise in
the use of the en banc procedure reflected a "conservative revolution."'
38
Even the late Justice Harry Blackmun publicly expressed concern about
the politicization of en banc rehearings at a meeting of the district and
circuit judges of the Eighth Circuit:
The other [matter that I am disturbed about] is what I've
noticed.., in some of the other courts of appeals, and there will be
some criticism from some of the speakers here on this one, but
when I see in en banc hearings, all the appointees of the present
administration voting one way and all the appointees of prior
administrations, Democrat or Republican, voting the other way. I
am a little bit concerned. Maybe I am more than a little bit
concerned.'39
Some Reagan judges did in fact call for an increased use of en banc
decisionmaking, 40 but none observed that their fellow appointees had
the Circuits, Use of En Banc Review on Upswing, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Sept. 23, 1992, at 2
(discussing popular perception that en bane review reflects political maneuvering on bench).
137. By the time he left office, Ronald Reagan had appointed nearly half of the appeals court
judges (76 out of 168 active judges). Herman Schwartz, Packing the Courts: The Conservative
Campaign to Rewrite the Constitution 150 (1988). Reagan majorities governed seven circuits. Note,
Politics, supra note 16, at 865 n.4. Court watchers argued that Reagan majorities were dramatically
affecting public policies through rulings on lower courts. See, e.g., Stephen Wermeil, The New
Judiciary: Reagan-Picked Judges Put the Federal Courts on Conservative Path, Wall St. J., Dec. 18,
1984, at 70 (detailing critics' complgints about political biases of Reagan appeals court appointees
and recounting evidence supporting critics' claims).
138. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 137, at 155 (concluding that "[m]any cases in the District of
Columbia Circuit were en banced because the conservative majority on the circuit led by Judge Bork
was unhappy with the decision, and there are indications that this is happening in other circuits as
well"); Oliphant, supra note 129, at 702-05 (discussing claims that Reagan appointees have changed
philosophy governing use of en bane review resulting in political polarization in circuit courts);
J. Bret Treier, Increased En Banc Activity by the Sixth Circuit, 19 U. Tol. L. Rev. 277, 277, 280-82,
299 (1988) (observing notable rise in en bane review rate in Sixth Circuit and arguing that it was
produced by shifting partisanship on court); Note, Politics, supra note 16, at 867-68 (presenting
quantitative evidence of political use of en bane procedure by Reagan judge voting blocs), 868-75
(reviewing D.C. Circuit en bane cases for descriptive support of politicization of en bane process);
Wermiel, supra note 23, at 70 (observing that "[d]uring the Carter period, en bane review grew more
slowly than the number of judges, but during the Reagan years, the en bane increase was faster than
the growth in judges"). But see Solimine, supra note 5, at 62 (arguing based on review of cases that
no clear party lines could be drawn in en bane decisions). Solimine's methodology has been
criticized, however, for failing to consider cases decided in 1988 and for adopting an underinclusive
coding scheme. Note, Politics, supra note 16, at 866-68.
139. Smith, supra note 18, at 133-34 (quoting Address by Justice Harry Blackmun, Eighth
Circuit Judicial Conference, St. Louis, Mo. (July 15, 1988)).
140. See, e.g., Susan Rice, Earl Warren Would Blush, Am. Law. Newspapers, May/June 1988, at
46, 48 (Special Supp.) (observing that one of Reagan's most conservative appointments, Ninth
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agreed to use the procedure to ensure that panel decisions were
consistent with the new circuit majorities. 4 '
1. Questioning the Ideological Direction of the Case
The attitudinal theory produces the expectation that a circuit's
ideological majority is more likely to review a panel ruling adopting the
minority's position (an ideologically opposed outcome) than a ruling
adopting the majority's position. The attitudinal theory accounts for
judicial behavior by assuming that judges will seek to maximize their
personal policy preferences. Judges, then, will be more likely to vote for
en banc rehearing of a panel decision that is contrary to their preferred
outcome (having no incentive to rehear a case with which they agree).
Accordingly, a majority of a circuit's judges will vote to rehear a panel
decision when the decision reaches a conclusion that conflicts with the
circuit majority's ideology. Assuming that policy preferences follow
party lines, a court dominated by Republican appointees will more likely
grant rehearing to a liberal panel ruling than a conservative ruling.
The attitudinal theory's prediction can also be drawn from normative
claims made in favor of en banc rehearing. Proponents of regular use of
en banc review typically argue that the circuit's majority has the right to
review decisions that are inconsistent with the majority's views. For
example, D.C. Circuit Judge Douglas Ginsburg has taken the position
that "the decisions of the panels ideally should reflect the views of the
court as a whole, or where that is not possible because the court is
divided, come as close as possible to that ideal by reflecting the views of
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, "has strongly urged the court to conduct more en banc hearings");
Wermiel, supra note 23, at 70 (reporting that "court sources say Judge [Frank] Easterbrook[, a
Reagan appointee to the Seventh Circuit,]... has urged a Reagan-appointed majority to make
greater use of en banc review" and quoting Easterbrook as arguing that en banc rehearing is "a
stabilizing process that makes sure the majority's voice is heard").
141. But, a number of Democratic appointees have observed as much. See, e.g., Bartlett ex rel.
Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Edwards, J., concurring). In
Bartlett, Judge Harry Edwards, a Carter appointee, concurred with the D.C. Circuit decision to
vacate an order granting rehearing en banc in three cases that Reagan judges were abusing en banc
procedure by interpreting Rule 35 standard in "self-serving and result-oriented" manner. See also,
e.g., Wermiel, supra note 23, at 70 (quoting from speech presented by D.C. Circuit Chief Judge
Patricia Wald, Carter appointee, in which she proffered that "[there is increasing resort to en bancs
to overrule venerable, heretofore respected... precedents ... [which] is plainly a symptom of the
rapidly changing makeup of the court").
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a majority of the court." '42 Judge Ginsburg does not enunciate the view
that court alignments follow party lines, but it is implicit in his claims
and the claims of other circuit judges that if conflicting ideological
positions cause divisions in a court, then the majority view should
prevail.143 Under this view, then, a panel ruling opposed to the majority's
preferences warrants en bane reconsideration.
2. Examining Decisions ofPanels Composed ofMinority
Party Members
Judges may be more likely to vote for en banc rehearing of decisions
by panels composed entirely or primarily of judges from the opposite
ideological perspective. They may do so because of ideological
polarization. Judges, despite their self-classification as formalists, may
consider their colleagues to be partisan, particularly those with whom
they disagree.'" Consequently, judges may assume that any panel
majority comprised of judges with whom they disagree will reach an
ideologically motivated outcome with which they will also disagree.'45
Or, judges trying to decide whether to grant en banc review may look to
a panel's composition in order to save time. Judges must invest time in
closely reading all decisions in which they did not participate in order to
label a panel ruling as liberal or conservative. They may adopt a short-
hand method for determining the ideological direction of a panel decision
by looking to the panel's composition.
En banc rehearing requires a majority of the court's active members to
vote in favor of review; hence, a court's majority controls the en banc
process. A majority party judge ("mainstreamer") would expect that a
panel dominated by judges from the minority party ("outliers") would be
142. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 16, at 1034-39 (emphasis added) (arguing that "majority
should rule" circuit). But see United States v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242 (D.C. Cir.), vacated & reh'g en
banc granted, 816 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir.), opinion reinstated & reh 'g en banc order vacated, 824 F.2d
1240, 1241-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring) (challenging view that "every time a
majority of the judges disagree with a panel decision, they should get rid of it by rehearing the case
en bane).
143. See generally supra note 140.
144. See, e.g., supra note 141.
145. The attitudinal model would generally predict that such should be the case, depending on the
discretion available. Cf Atkins, supra note 18, at 626-27, 637-40 (observing that minority-
controlled panels of D.C. Circuit in 1956-1962 were likely to follow their policy preferences in
criminal law cases raising constitutional issues despite inconsistency of these preferences with
circuit majority's policy orientation).
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more likely to issue a ruling contrary to her policy preferences.'46
Mainstreamers, then, according to the attitudinal theory, will be more
likely to vote for rehearing en banc when outliers dominate a panel.'4 7
Because mainstreamers control the grant of en banc review, a circuit
would more likely review a panel controlled by outliers.
C. Hierarchical Theory
Within the past decade, judicial process scholars have enriched our
understanding of judicial behavior by utilizing organization theory as
developed in other fields of political science'48 and economics. 49 While
recognizing that judges seek to attain their policy preferences,
organization theorists observe that appellate judges do not make their
decisions in isolation, but rather act as part of a group and within a
hierarchical structure. 50  Organization studies draw primarily on
146. I adopt the outlier-mainstreamer language used by Steven Van Winkle. See generally Van
Winkle, supra note 126.
147. Cf Oliphant, supra note 129, at 749-50 (finding in review of Eighth Circuit decisions that
conservative circuit majority granted en banc review to overturn liberal panels); Solimine, supra
note 5, at 30-3 1. Solimine observes:
Bork, Ginsburg, and other Reagan-appointed appellate jurists were said to be using the en banc
procedure to review and reverse panel decisions by other, more liberal judges. Merely because
they disagreed with the results reached by panels comprising [sic] of or dominated by more
liberal judges, Reagan-appointed judges were said to be voting indiscriminately for en banc
consideration of those decisions.
Id.
148. For judicial studies utilizing organization theory, see, e.g., James C. Brent, An Agent and
Two Principals: United States Courts of Appeal Responses to Employment Division v. Smith and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 27 Am. Pol. Q. (forthcoming Apr. 1999); Segal et at., supra
note 125, at 237-44 (testing hierarchical, legal, and attitudinal models by using sample of court of
appeals search and seizure cases); and Van Winkle, supra note 126. For a thoughtful consideration
of the development of organization theory in the field of economics and the theory's possible
applications in political science, see Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 739, 739 (1984) (describing approach he terms "new economics of organization" as
characterized by "a contractual perspective on organizational relationships, a theoretical focus on
hierarchical control, and formal analysis via principal-agent models").
149. See generally Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization & Management
(1992); Gary J. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy (1992); Kenneth
J. Arrow, Agency and the Market, in 3 Handbook of Mathematical Economics 1183 (Kenneth J.
Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds., 1986).
150. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 102, at 27-28 (observing how "the decisions of judges are
almost always the product of collaborative efforts and group/institutional constraints"); Van Winkle,
supra note 126, at 2-5. J. Woodford Howard observed the impact of group dynamics and
organization structure on the behavior of appellate judges in his early study of the Second, Fifth, and
D.C. Circuits. Howard, supra note 1, at 189-221.
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principal-agent theory to explain hierarchical relationships within the
judicial system.'
Organization theory applied to the relationship between the en banc
court and the three-judge panels begins with the premise that the court
and panels have entered into an implicit but incomplete agency
agreement (known as a "relational contract")., The principal-agent
construct situates the circuit court as the principal authorizing the panel
as agent to act on its behalf. The circuit bench delegates the resolution of
some cases to a given panel. The panel has limited discretion to resolve
the disputes assigned to it.' Although circuit court precedent in the form
of published opinions explicitly limits the panel, the panel is also limited
implicitly by informal circuit norms." When a circuit learns that a panel
has violated any shared expectation about appropriate behavior, the
circuit will act to censor the panel.'55 Monitoring the panel's behavior
involves difficulties and costs for the circuit because of information
asymmetries; hence, circuit judges will typically rely on "signals," or
warning signs, to alert them when a panel has exceeded its authority.'56
151. See, e.g., Segal et al., supra note 125, at 233 (examining relationship between circuit courts
and Supreme Court by utilizing principal-agent theory--"a theory of strategic decision making
within hierarchical settings"). See generally Van Winkle, supra note 126, at 1. Songer, Segal, and
Cameron were the first to apply the insights of principal-agent theory to the judicial hierarchy,
modeling the relationship between the Supreme Court as principal and the courts of appeals as
agents. Songer et al., supra note 126; see also Moe, supra note 148, at 756 (explaining from
exhaustive review of relevant literature that principal-agent model is "the dominant framework for
the formal analysis of hierarchy").
152. Van Winkle, supra note 126, at 3-5 (describing creation of "relational contract" between
circuit courts and three-judge panels).
153. Cf Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 149, at 131-32 (explaining principal's delegation of
authority to agent by way of incomplete contract, which sets forth general, rather than detailed,
boundaries on agent's authority).
154. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 1, at 191-92 (discussing development and influence of
informal norms and procedures on decisionmaking within circuit courts); cf. Peter F. Nardulli, The
Courtroom Elite: An Organizational Perspective on Criminal Justice 66 (1978) (explaining how
collective efforts by courtroom elites--judges and lawyers-produce shared norms); Gibson, supra
note 102, at 29 (describing norm formation on courts).
155. Van Winkle, supra note 126, at 3-4.
156. See, e.g., Songer et al., supra note 126, at 674 (describing how "[d]ifficulty in monitoring,"
"asymmetric information," and "transactions costs" provide agents with opportunity to reach
decisions contrary to principal's dictates); Van Winkle, supra note 126, at 4; cf Arrow, supra note
149, at 1183-84 (explaining problems of "hidden action," known as "moral hazard," and "hidden
information," known as "adverse selection," in principal-agent relationship); Moe, supra note 148, at
754-55 (discussing concepts of adverse selection and moral hazard, which are at core of theory of
hierarchical relationships).
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En bane review of the panel's decision represents the circuit's only
formal control mechanism.1 57
From a principal-agent perspective, litigants will accept the rulings of
a panel as long as they do not question the panel's authority to act on
behalf of the circuit. Obviously, active use of the en bane procedure
would cast the panel's authority into doubt. On the other hand, the legal
system at large will accept the circuit delegating authority to panels as
long as the system remains confident that the circuit will exercise control
over the panel. A court's reluctance to instigate en banc review will
decrease the legal system's confidence in the circuit's control over
panels. The tension between these interests should mean that courts use
en bane review only when a panel has clearly exceeded its authority." 8
1. Reinforcing the Affirmation Norm
Circuit courts of appeals do not share the Supreme Court's prerogative
to select cases for review. Thus, most appeals court decisions involve
routine examinations of lower court outcomes, primarily using highly
deferential standards of review such as abuse of discretion or plain
error. 59 Courts of appeals reverse only about twenty percent of the cases
they review, 16 compared with a reversal rate of sixty to sixty-five
percent for the Supreme Court. 16' Hence, it appears that the courts of
appeals share an expectation that their decisions will affirm lower court
rulings. Principal-agent theory would hold that such a strong norm acts
157. Van Winkle, supra note 126, at 3 (noting that "[e]n banc review ... is the only intra-circuit
way to enforce the terms of the incomplete contract, ex post, when a violation is suspected").
158. Cf id. at 7-8 (arguing that en banc rehearing should "be resorted to in only the most
egregious departures from circuit preferences or the most salient, controversial, and/or novel issues"
because process is so costly).
159. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint
andFreedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 Yale L.J. 255, 256 n.7 (1961) (reporting that one co-
author, U.S. Circuit Judge Clark, "in a subjective test covering 300 appeals on which he has sat
during the last two years, found clear one-way cases comprised at least 70%, while around 10% were
highly original cases giving scope to the method of social values. In the remaining 20%, the outcome
actually proved certain, but counsel might be forgiven for thinking they had a bare chance of
success."); Maurice Rosenberg, Standards of Review, in Restructuring Justice, supra note 65, at 30,
31 (explaining that in many instances "the court of appeals [is] obliged by established standards to
affirm unless, for example, crucial fact findings were not merely in error but clearly so ... [likewise,
d]iscretionary rulings [have] to be not merely incorrect, but abusive").
160. See Davis & Songer, supra note 1, at 332-33 (reporting that average rate of reversal for all
circuits in 1984 was 17.5%).
161. See Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 212.
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as an implicit limitation on the authority of panels; therefore, if a panel
reverses a lower court, the panel's decision would violate that limitation.
Nonpanelists can detect violations of the affirmation norm relatively
easily and thus decide whether to exact the sanction of en banc review on
panels that deviate from the norm.
2. Responding to a Dissenting Judge
Under principal-agent theory, a circuit court will grant en banc
rehearing whenever it learns that a panel violated the terms of the
relational contract. Monitoring the decisions of individual panels to learn
if any of the panels have breached the agreement costs a circuit court
time, energy, and resources. 62 The circuit will more likely learn of a
breach when one panelist dissents because that judge has access to
greater information than the non-panelists and has an incentive to persuade
the other non-panelists to grant en banc review. Moreover, the mere fact of
a dissent signals to a nonpanelist that she may justifiably expend personal
resources to rehear the case or at least investigate it further. 6
3. Limiting the Influence ofDesignated and/or Senior Judges
Three-judge panels are composed of active circuit judges as well as
retired members from the circuit"6 and temporarily designated members
162. See, e.g., Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 16, at 1032-33. Judge Ginsburg explains that when it
comes to identifying "panel error," judges not on the original panel are at a significant informational
disadvantage as compared to panelists because they are less familiar with the case and did not
participate in oral argument. "Nor would it make sense for each nonpanelist to acquire that degree of
familiarity in order to vote on the suggestion for rehearing. The burden of doing so every time a
suggestion was not facially without merit would be overwhelming." Id. at 1033. As Van Winkle
explains in an article examining the role of panel dissents as a signal to other members of a court:
"The panel knows what it has done. The other judges of the circuit have to expend scarce resources
to learn even thepanel's version of what it has done (i.e. the opinion)." Van Winkle, supra note 126,
at 8; ef Moe, supra note 148, at 756 (explaining that principal's primary difficulty in monitoring
agent's actions arises from fact that information about those "actions and the inputs on which they
are based is not only imperfect but skewed in favor of the agent").
163. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 16, at 1047 (contending that "if the panel was divided, the
nonpanelist not only knows that the losing argument was capable of persuading at least one judge; he
or she also has the benefit of that judge's opinion, which can be read without concern that it is
skewed by the zeal of an advocate"); cf. Patricia Wald, The D.C. Circuit: Here and Now, 55 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 718, 719 (1987) (revealing that dissents are often described by other judges as signal
to Supreme Court that case is worthy of grant of certiorari).
164. Federal circuit judges who have retired from regular active service may ask to serve on cases
within their circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 294(b)-(c) (1994).
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from other federal courts.'6 5 As caseloads have grown, so has the
circuits' reliance on judges who are not active members of the circuit. 66
For various reasons, the active membership may choose to review
decisions by panels comprised of, in part, designated and/or senior
judges. Active judges may suspect that non-active judges will not feel the
same respect for and deference to circuit precedent or simply not have
the same knowledge of it given their itinerant status.6 7 Or, they may not
approve of non-active judges establishing the law of the circuit.'68 Thus,
they would more likely grant en banc rehearing to panels with one or
more senior and/or designated judges.
While it is somewhat intuitive that active circuit judges may question
the authority of visiting judges, it may appear less obvious that they will
question senior circuit judges who were at one time active members of
the court. Unlike visiting judges, senior circuit judges do not owe
allegiance to another court, nor do they appear to be interlopers.
However, active circuit judges have expressed the view that senior
judges should not be able to constrain the progression of the law.'69
165. The Judicial Code provides that the chief judge of a circuit may assign district judges from
within the circuit to sit and decide cases brought before the circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (1994). The
Code also provides that the Chief Justice, at the request of the chief judge or circuit justice of a
circuit, 28 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1994), may assign retired Supreme Court justices with their consent, 28
U.S.C. § 294(a) (1994), as well as circuit judges from other circuits, 28 U.S.C. § 291(a), to sit
temporarily on the circuit. These designated judges have the same authority as circuit judges in the
cases in which they participate.
166. Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An Examination of
the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the United States Courts of Appeals, 28
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 351, 363-66 (1995) (observing that growth in caseload has corresponded with
increasing utilization of designated district court judges and considering adverse effects of such
reliance).
167. Stephen Wasby found in interviews with Ninth Circuit judges that three of nine judges
interviewed reported that the use of designated judges was resulting in inconsistent and incoherent
decisions, "causing 'severe problems,"' while the remaining six felt that designated judges
"contributed to inconsistency 'idiosyncratically."' Stephen L. Washy, "Extra" Judges in a Federal
Appellate Court: The Ninth Circuit, 15 L. & Soc'y Rev. 369, 374 (1980-81); see also Saphire &
Solimine, supra note 166, at 371-75; Wasby, supra, at 379 (reporting that Ninth Circuit judges were
concerned that visiting district and circuit judges were loyal to another institution); cf Atkins, supra
note 18, at 630 (observing that "the regular recruitment of outside judges... increases the
probability of inconsistent decision-making" in part due to "the likelihood that semi-retired and
visiting judges are less aware of precedents indigenous to particular circuits than are active court
members").
168. See Madden, supra note 22, at 417; cf Saphire & Solimine, supra note 166, at 374.
169. Wasby, supra note 167, at 377-78.
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D. An Integrated Theory
I have extended the dominant judicial behavior theories by applying
them to the decision to grant en banc review and generated hypotheses to
explain the decision. The legal, attitudinal, and hierarchical hypotheses
form an integrated model of the decision to grant en banc rehearing as set
forth below. Each hypothesis predicts a relationship between a
characteristic of the panel decision (e.g., the case involved an issue that
was the subject of intracircuit conflict) and the likelihood of en banc
rehearing. The direction of the hypothesized effect of each factor is
positive (e.g., an intracircuit conflict increases the likelihood that a panel
will be reheard en banc).
An Integrated Model of the Decision to Grant En Banc Rehearing
Theory Panel Characteristic
Intracircuit conflict
Legal Intercircuit conflict
Outlier ideological directionOutlier majority
Reverse lower court or agency
Dissenting panelist
Designated judge on panel
Non-active judges on panel
Hypothesized Effect
Increase likelihood
Increase likelihood
Increase likelihood
Increase likelihood
Increase likelihood
Increase likelihood
Increase likelihood
Increase likelihood
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The proposed integrated model of the decision to grant en banc
rehearing stands on solid theoretical underpinnings. Empirical analysis
should establish whether the model accurately predicts when a court will
rehear a panel ruling en banc. Moreover, empirical testing will establish
whether evidence supports each hypothesis and will measure the relative
import of each panel characteristic to the decision to grant en banc
rehearing.
Hierarchical
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A. The Data
I drew my data from three of the twelve general subject-matter
jurisdiction circuits: the Second, Fourth, and Eighth. 7' Those three
circuits held 305 en banc rehearings between 1956 and 1996.171 To create
a control group of cases from each circuit, a systematic random sample
stratified by decision year was collected. Two cases were selected for
each en banc rehearing in a given year, creating a random sample of 610
panel decisions that were not reheard en banc.
The cases were examined and several features of each case were
recorded. Each case was categorized as one of eight broad issue types 72
derived from categories used in two databases of federal court decisions,
170. I selected the Fourth and Eighth Circuits largely out of personal interest and familiarity. I
had the great honor of clerking for Fourth Circuit Judge Francis D. Murnaghan, Jr., and I currently
teach at a public law school in the Eighth Circuit's jurisdiction. After I discovered that both circuits
have relatively high rates of en bane review, I sought to include a circuit that was less likely to grant
en bane rehearing. I chose the Second.
The Second Circuit historically, and perhaps intentionally, has had the relatively lowest number of
en bane cases. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 16, at 7 (reporting with satisfaction that author's
circuit, Second, "has the lowest rate of rehearings en bane of all the circuits"); Solimine, supra note
5, at 42 & n.71, 45 (observing that "Second Circuit Judges have long been on record as opposing any
extensive use of the en bane procedure"). Congress added a fourth judgeship to the Second Circuit in
1911, a fifth in 1929, and a sixth in 1955, but the court did not hear a case en bane until 1956
primarily because the chief judges until that time were opposed to the en bane procedure. Morris,
supra note 28, at 135; Marvin Schick, Learned Hand's Court 76, 115-20 (1970) (describing Learned
Hand's "dogged[] oppos[ition] to full court hearings" and recounting how "during [Hand's] chief
judgeship and several years thereafter, only the panel system was employed"). In the 1960s and '70s,
the court was divided on the appropriate use of the en bane procedure and as a consequence a
majority could rarely be garnered in support of rehearing. Howard, supra note 1, at 218; Schick,
supra note 170, at 120-22. The 1980s and '90s have not seen a significant rise in use as reflected in
Second Circuit Judge Newman's trilogy of articles detailing every Second Circuit en bane case
decided over a 15-year period. See, e.g., Newman, The Virtues of Restraint, supra note 16, at 491
(observing that "[t]he salient characteristic of [the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit] during 1989-93 is the continuation of an extremely low rate of rehearings en bane").
171. WESTLAW and LEXIS searches were conducted to identify all en bane cases decided by
those circuits following a panel ruling. The Second Circuit decided 90 en bane cases, of which 64
followed panel decisions; the Fourth Circuit decided 284 en bane cases, of which 128 followed panel
decisions; and the Eighth Circuit decided 151 en bane cases, of which 113 followed panel decisions.
In some instances, the panel circulated an opinion among the rest of the circuit but did not issue the
opinion because the court voted to rehear the case en bane prior to the release of the opinion. If the
en bane decision described the outcome and votes in the original panel ruling, then the panel
decision was included in the database and is considered here. If not, the panel ruling could not be
included in the database because of insufficient information about its characteristics.
172. The issue areas are criminal, civil rights, First Amendment, due process (non-criminal),
privacy, labor relations, economic regulation and activity, and miscellaneous.
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the Supreme Court Database 73 and the U.S. Court of Appeals
Database. 74 Each decision is categorized as liberal or conservative to
establish the ideological direction variable, again using the Supreme
Court and U.S. Court of Appeals databases as guides. 75 The dichotomous
ideological variable reflects whether the court supports or opposes the
issue to which the case pertains.76 This Article defers to the categori-
zations developed by the authors of those databases for three reasons:
(1) to allow comparisons between my results and the results in studies
using those databases; (2) to provide for easier replication of my study;
173. See Harold J. Spaeth, United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-1993 Terms:
Documentation (6th ICPSR version 1995) (last visited Apr. 24, 1999) <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
cgi/subject.prl?path=ICPSR&query=XII>. This multiuser database, funded by the National Science
Foundation and available as a computer file through the Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research (ICPSR), encompasses all aspects of U.S. Supreme Court decisionmaking
during the 1953 through 1993 terms and is constantly updated. The data file includes a
documentation file explaining the coding methodology.
174. See Donald R. Songer, The United States Courts of Appeals Data Base Documentation
(Rough Draft 8/26/96) (on file with author). The U.S. Court of Appeals Database, modeled after the
Supreme Court Database and also funded by the National Science Foundation, will contain two sets
of data. The first is a random sample of the cases from each circuit for each year for the period
1925-1988. The total size for this sample will be approximately 20,000 cases. The second part will
include all the appeals court cases whose decisions were reviewed by the Supreme Court in a
decision reported in a full opinion in United States Reports for the period covered by the Supreme
Court Data Base, Phase I. Donald R. Songer, The United States Courts of Appeals Data Base,
L. & Courts, Summer 1996, at 23, 23. This phase was expected to result in the coding of
approximately 4000 additional cases. Id. The Database is not yet available through the ICPSR.
175. Obviously we could debate at length the meaning and application of the worn-out ideological
labels "liberal" and "conservative," but the definitions provided by the authors of the databases defer
to their common meaning during this century and, more importantly, are explicit about their content.
Thus, the variable is a valid and reliable measure because it is explicitly and specifically defined
even if the conservative/liberal labels lack specificity of meaning. While these labels have lost some
precision in general discourse, they remain the "most generally used to distinguish between opposed
complexes of preferences in matters of public policy." See C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt
Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937-47, at 33-34 (1948). The present study, by
relying on consistent categorizations, can be compared to and used with other studies.
176. In criminal, civil rights, First Amendment, due process (non-criminal), and privacy, a
decision was "liberal" if it was one of the following (and "conservative' if the opposite): pro-
criminal defendant, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, pro-indigent, pro-Native American,
pro-affirmative action, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-government in non-takings due
process, or pro-disclosure (except employment or student records).
For cases involving labor relations or economic regulation and activity, a decision was "liberal" if
it was one of the following (and "conservative" if the opposite): pro-union (except union anti-trust),
pro-competition, anti-business, anti-employer, pro-liability, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-
small business, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Native American, pro-environmental protection, pro-
consumer, pro-accountability, or anti-arbitration.
Miscellaneous cases were not classified by ideological direction because they did not lend
themselves to a reliable categorization.
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and (3) perhaps most importantly, to defer to formulations crafted over
time and through debate among court scholars.
Each case was coded according to its disposition'77 and whether the
appellant could be deemed the "winner." A decision was treated as a win
if the appealing or petitioning party emerged at least partially victorious.
This variable allows for the distinction between reversals that reflect a
substantive win for the appellant and those that are simply a matter of
formality. Under the typology used here, a panel reverses a lower court
or agency when the disposition is reversed in whole or in part and the
appellant "wins."
Each judge's vote and the nature of her participation was recorded. If
a judge concurred in part and dissented in part, her opinion (or the
opinion she joined) was examined to determine whether it agreed with
the ideological direction coded for the majority opinion. If a judge agreed
with some preliminary holding of the majority but disagreed with its
ultimate conclusion and ideological direction, she was treated as
dissenting. If, however, she essentially agreed with the court's primary
holding and ideological direction, but disagreed about means or
implications described in dicta, then the judge was treated as concurring.
The judges from within the circuit were also categorized according to
their status (active or senior) and the party of the President who
appointed them (Republican or Democrat). Visiting judges were not
identified by the party of the President who appointed them.
78
A case was identified as involving an intracircuit split if any member
of the panel explicitly stated that two panels of the circuit had reached
different decisions in analogous circumstances. Similarly, a case was
identified as addressing an issue that was the subject of an intercircuit split
if a member of the panel stated as much.'79 The conflict had to be express
and direct, not merely a matter of general or logical inconsistency. 8 '
177. The disposition variable is one of eight types: affirmed, reversed, reversed and remanded,
vacated and remanded, affirmed in part and reversed/vacated in part, affirmed in part and
reversed/vacated in part and remanded, vacated, and dismissed.
178. Visiting judges were classified according to their permanent posts: senior circuit judges from
other circuits, senior district judges, active district judges, and retired Supreme Court justices.
179. My identification of intercircuit conflict is not as comprehensive as that utilized by Hellman,
who examined all filings in a sample of certiorari petitions for claims of conflict. Arthur D. Hellman,
By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 693 (1995). Hellman looked for one of two indications of conflict: "acknowledgment by the
courts of decision and recognition by other participants in the legal system." Id. at 708. I relied
solely on the former. Like Hellman, I did not go further and seek to determine whether the
acknowledged conflict was "'genuine' or 'direct,"' id. at 709, although for a different reason: I am
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B. Descriptive Statistics
To confirm that each variable was in fact related to en banc rehearing,
the simple bivariate relationship between each hypothesized factor and
the decision to grant en banc review is computed. Two-by-two tables
reveal the breakdown of cases by a selected panel characteristic (such as
whether the panel was unanimous) and whether the panel was reheard en
banc. Statistical tests of relationship (primarily Pearson's chi-square test
of independence) provide a more rigorous measure of that relationship (if
one exists). The tables and simple statistics disclose that the data strongly
support most, but not all, hypotheses.
1. Resolving an Intracircuit Conflict
Intracircuit conflict is highly unusual in the Second, Fourth, and
Eighth Circuits;' ' yet, the relationship between a cited intracircuit
trying to understand judicial behavior, and hence, the fact that a judge has claimed there is a conflict
represents a judicial perception of conflict.
180. Judges may disagree as to whether a conflict has indeed been created. Solimine, supra note
5, at 35-40 & n.53. To try to overcome this difficulty, I adopted the basic standard set forth by
Thomas Goldstein, who writes the monthly Circuit Split Roundup for the Bureau of National
Affairs: a case involves or produces a split if it "acknowledge[s] and describe[s] disagreements."
See, e.g., Thomas Goldstein, Circuit Split Roundup, 66 U.S.L.W. 2655 (Apr. 28, 1998) (emphasis
added). In seeking to distinguish true intracircuit and intercircuit conflicts from merely superficial
inconsistencies, I also relied on the insights of Hellman's Theory of Intracircuit Conflict. Arthur
Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 Ariz. St.
L.J. 915, 922-41 (1991). Hellman developed a three-step test to determine whether a true conflict
exists. He found in a sample of Ninth Circuit decisions from 1983 and 1986 that new cases generally
do not directly disagree with earlier precedent but rather "follow, extend, or distinguish existing
precedents" consistent with "the common-law process." ld. at 965- 66.
181. My findings here are consistent with Howard's study of the Fifth Circuit, Hellman's
investigation of Ninth Circuit decisions, and several reviews of en bane D.C. Circuit rulings. See
Howard, supra note 1, at 215-16 (disclosing that "[o]f sixty-five en bancs held by the 5th circuit in
1968-1972, for instance, only five were called to settle panel conflicts" despite sense that circuit's
growing size was leading to interpanel discord); Hellman, supra note 180, at 921 (concluding that
"the Ninth Circuit has generally succeeded in avoiding conflicts between panel decisions");
Hellman, supra note 17, at 548-50 (examining 9th Circuit intracourt memoranda regarding whether
to grant en bane review for 1981 to 1986 period and finding that intracircuit inconsistency was cited
as concern in only 75 cases, and of those was primary concern in less than 60); see, e.g., Note,
Politics, supra note 16, at 876 n.60 (finding that only one of 13 en bane D.C. Circuit cases decided
between 1986 and 1988 involved explicit intracircuit conflict). Bennett and Pembroke found that
conflict resolution was involved in only eight of 76, or 10.5%, of cases decided en bane by the D.C.
Circuit from 1971 through 1985. See Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 22, at 537. The authors found
no direct intracircuit conflicts in their random sample of 200 panel rulings drawn from the 1971-
1980 period, but did find six instances in which a case was listed by Shepard's Citations as
subsequently questioned, criticized, or limited. Id. at 538 & nA1. The Shepard's Citations
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conflict and a grant of en banc rehearing is statistically significant 18 2 as
reflected in the Fisher's exact test results.'83 The evidence supports the
hypothesis that a majority of circuit judges will vote for en banc review
whenever such a clear conflict has been expressed in an opinion by one
of the panelists. 184 If courts limited en banc rehearings to such circum-
stances, however, these rehearings would practically vanish.
information is not particularly illuminating; it is a commercial service aimed at an overinclusive
characterization of cases so that practitioners may be certain that relevant case law is still
controlling. It also lacks clear operationalizations (resulting in reliability problems) and includes
dissents, which would not be the basis for finding any circuit conflict.
The relatively low number of cases with explicit conflicts may simply be the product of the rule
adopted by most circuits that all panels are bound by the decisions of earlier panels of the court. See,
e.g., Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 22, at 536 & n.37 (citing cases holding that their respective
circuits had adopted law of circuit rule); Carrington, supra note 16, at 580; Hellman, supra note 179,
at 699 n.20 (explaining that all courts of appeals follow rule that panel rulings bind later panels
unless overruled by en banc circuit or Supreme Court); Hellman, supra note 17, at 545 & n.13. A
few circuits allow a panel to overrule existing circuit precedent if the panel circulates a proposal to
do so and none of the other active judges disagrees. It is essentially an en-banc-bypass device. See
generally Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 22 (examining this process at length).
182. Statistical significance is a technical term not to be confused with importance or validity. To
say that a finding is statistically significant at the .001 level means that the finding would not have
occurred by chance more than one time in a thousand. By convention, a finding that has a random
probability of less than .05 is described as statistically significant. Alan Agresti & Barbara Finlay,
Statistical Methodsfor the Social Sciences 146, 152 (2d ed. 1986) (explaining meaning of p-values
and distinction between statistical and practical significance).
183. I use Fisher's exact test rather than the traditional chi-square test of independence because
the expected frequency is less than five for one cell in a two-by-two table (that is, in 25% of the
cells). See, e.g., id. at 207 (explaining rationale for using different test for smaller expected
frequencies); Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics 292-97 (rev. 2d ed. 1979) (providing method for
computing Fisher's exact statistic); R. Mark Sirkin, Statistics for the Social Sciences 364 (1995)
(presenting contingency flow chart for tests of relationship including chi-square and Fisher's exact).
184. Arthur Hellman asked lawyers, district judges, and circuit judges in the Ninth Circuit
whether they agreed with the following statement: "When intracircuit conflicts do arise, the Court of
Appeals generally resolves them through modification of opinions or en banc rehearings." Hellman,
Maintaining Consistency, supra note 99, at 56. Nineteen out of 21 circuit judges agreed, but only
one-third of the district judges and fewer than one-third of the lawyers agreed. Id. My data indicates
that for the circuits considered here, the statement is true for conflicts acknowledged in a majority,
concurring, or dissenting opinion.
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Table 1. Relationship Between Intracircuit Conflict
and En Banc Rehearing
INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT ROW
Conflict Cited No Conflict TOTAL
ReheardEn Banc 12 293 305
No Rehearing 0 610 610
COLUMN TOTAL 12 903 915
- Fisher's exact test: p < .00 1.
2. Considering an Intercircuit Conflict
A majority of circuit judges did not display the same willingness to
rehear en banc cases involving a legal question that is the subject of a
clear and direct intercircuit conflict; but, as Table 2 reveals, panels
reheard en banc were nearly six times more likely to involve an
intercircuit dispute than panels not reheard en banc. The data also
disclose that judges did not frequently cite intercircuit conflict, an
interesting point in light of the growing concern about a perceived crisis
of doctrinal inconsistency between circuit courts.' Again, the
relationship between rehearing en banc and the hypothesized factor-an
acknowledged intercircuit conflict-is statistically significant: it is
highly unlikely (less than .01%) that this correlation resulted from
chance.
86
185. See, e.g., Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 61, at 25-40 (providing overview of debate over
Supreme Court's failure and/or inability to address all intercircuit conflicts); Hellman, supra note
179, at 794-97 (acknowledging that substantial portion of Supreme Court's docket consists of cases
involving circuit split, but concluding, based on study of petitions for certiorari, that concern over
increasing numbers of unresolved intercircuit conflicts is "misplaced" because existing conflicts are
"tolerable" for various reasons).
186. For this table and those that follow, I utilize a Pearson chi-square statistic (X2) to determine
whether the two nominal variables are independent or dependent. The smaller the value of X2, the
greater the likelihood that the variables are dependent. The degrees of freedom of the chi-square
distribution is noted after "df." Agresti & Finlay, supra note 182, at 202-09.
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Table 2. Relationship Between Intercircuit Conflict
and En Bane Rehearing
INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICT ROW
Conflict Cited No Conflict TOTAL
Reheard En Banc 37 268 305
No Rehearing 15 595 610
COLUMN TOTAL 52 863 915
, X2= 35.49, df= 1, p <.001.
3. Questioning the Ideological Direction of the Case
Table 3(a) sets forth the ideological direction of the cases without
considering the composition of the circuit (including only the 890 cases
coded for ideological direction). The results indicate that a substantial
majority of panel rulings in the random sample, approximately seventy-
one percent, are ideologically conservative. In stark contrast, panels
reheard en banc reached a liberal decision nearly sixty-seven percent of
the time. The large, statistically significant chi square is expected in light
of these statistical findings. The data presents an image of extremely
conservative courts of appeals that are far more likely to rehear a liberal
decision en banc than a conservative one.
Table 3(a). Relationship Between Ideological Direction
and En Bane Rehearing
PANEL DIRECTION ROW
Liberal Conservative TOTAL
Reheard En Banc 192 96 288
No Rehearing 172 430 602
COLUMN TOTAL 364 526 890
* X2 = 129.10, df= 1, p < .001.
* 25 cases were excluded because the panel ruling was not coded for ideology.
Table 3(b) divides cases according to their ideological direction as
compared to the ideological direction of the court's majority (necessarily
excluding cases decided when the circuit court was evenly divided). 87
187. The Second Circuit had a Republican appointee majority for the entire period, but both the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits were at various times dominated by Republican appointees, Democratic
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Again, a significant relationship exists between en banc rehearing and
the ideological direction of interest. The circuit courts were much more
likely to vote to rehear en banc panel rulings adopting the outlier
ideological position. The relationship, however, is not as strong as that
tested in Table 3(a).
Table 3(b). Relationship Between Outlier Ideological Direction
and En Banc Rehearing
PANEL DIRECTION ROW
COMPARED TO MAJORITY'S TOTAL
POSITION
Disagreed Agreed
ReheardEn Banc 144 128 272
No Rehearing 204 303 507
COLUMN TOTAL 348 431 779
* %2 = 11.56, df= 1, p <.001.
* 25 cases were excluded because the panel ruling was not coded for ideology.
- 111 cases were excluded because the full court was evenly divided.
4. Examining Decisions ofPanels Controlled by Outliers
While the ideological direction of a panel's decision is strongly
correlated to the court's decision to grant en bane rehearing, the
ideological composition of the panel is not correlated to the court's
decision. Table 4 sets forth the number of panels with an outlier majority
(that is, two or three circuit judges from the minority party) that the court
reheard en banc.
appointees, or neither (that is, the court had an equal number of Republican and Democratic
appointees).
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Table 4. Relationship Between Panel Outlier Majority
and En Bane Rehearing
OUTLIER MAJORITY ROW
Yes No TOTAL
ReheardEn Banc 58 159 217
No Rehearing 122 311 433
COLUMN TOTAL 180 470 650
* X2= 0.15, df= 1, N.S. (not significant).
* 111 cases were excluded because the full court was evenly divided.
* 154 cases were excluded because the panel was evenly divided (one Republican
appointee, one Democratic appointee, and one designated judge).
Obviously, as a statistical matter, minority party judges will constitute
the majority of fewer panels, with the relative number influenced by how
much the majority outnumbered the minority. Thus, the fact that most
panels reheard en banc did not have an outlier majority does not alone
warrant rejecting the hypothesis. The percentage of panels reheard en
banc that had an outlier majority, however, essentially equaled the
percentage of panels not reheard en banc (26.7% versus 28.2%). Not
surprisingly then, the relationship between the panel's ideological
composition and rehearing en banc is not statistically significant, as
reflected in the chi-square statistic.'88
188. One possible explanation for the failure of the outlier majority hypothesis can be found in the
organization theory work of Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, and Steve Van Winkle. Cross and
Tiller argue that a three-judge majority is more likely than a two-judge majority to issue a partisan
decision because the presence of a single judge with a contrary position who can threaten to "blow
the whistle" has "a distinct political moderating effect." Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller,
Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155, 2173 (1998). Thus, Cross and Tiller conclude that a two-one
ideological split is less likely to produce a politically motivated outcome because of the strategic
influence of the one politically opposed judge. Van Winkle likewise has concluded that "[a] panel
with three outliers is most likely to behave opportunistically." Van Winkle, supra note 126, at 9. Van
Winkle also observes that a mainstreamer on a panel with two outliers has an incentive to dissent if
the outliers are reaching a decision contrary to the mainstreamers' preferences. Id. Their propositions
support the argument that a nonpanelist would only be inclined to grant en banc review to panels
composed only of outliers or composed of two outliers and a dissenting mainstreamer. These
perspectives may explain the failure of the outlier majority hypothesis, which does not differentiate
between a majority of two outliers and a majority of three outliers.
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5. Reinforcing the Affirmation Norm
In the random sample, panels affirmed the lower court or agency in
nearly seventy-three percent of the cases, as reflected in Table 5.189
Panels reheard en banc affirmed the lower court or agency less than forty
percent of the time. The relationship between the panel's treatment of the
lower court or agency's ruling and the panel being reheard en banc
reaches the level of statistical significance, as reflected in the large chi-
square. In this instance, the correlation is so apparent from the bare
numbers that one hardly needs to look to statistical tests to conclude that
the data strongly supports the hypothesis that panels violating the
affirmation norm are much more likely to be reheard by the full court.
Table 5. Relationship Between Reversal of Lower Court or Agency
and En Bane Rehearing
TREATMENT OF LOWER ROW
COURT OR AGENCY TOTAL
Affirm Reverse
Reheard En Banc 120 185 305
No Rehearing 442 168 610
COLUMN TOTAL 562 353 915
• = 94.10, df= 1, p <.001.
6. Responding to a Dissenting Judge
My data discloses that the typical case rarely has a dissent: a judge
expressly disagreed with her two colleagues in less than seven percent of
the panels in the random sample.9 ' The contrast between the random
189. This figure is similar to that reported by Davis and Songer for all circuits in 1984, and by
Howard for the Second, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits in 1965-67. See Davis & Songer, supra note 1, at
333 (reporting reversal rate of 17.5% for all circuits in 1984); Howard, supra note 1, at app. A
(reporting reversal rate of 17.2% for Second Circuit, 24A% for Fifth Circuit, and 19.6% for D.C.
Circuit).
190. The results from my sample are consistent with those found in studies of all cases, despite
the possibility that the authors of those studies adopted a different (probably a more liberal)
definition of "dissent." See, e.g., Atkins & Green, supra note 132, at 742-43 (finding that dissenting
votes were cast in 6.9% of all court of appeals decisions between 1966 and 1970); Goldman, supra
note 129, at 377 (finding that split decisions during fiscal years 1962-1964 accounted for 11.5% of
Second Circuit cases, 5.9% of Fourth Circuit cases, and 3.3% of Eighth Circuit cases); Goldman,
supra note 5, at 493; cf Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" of
Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 619, 642 (1985)
(reporting 5.8% dissent rate in D.C. Circuit during 1983-1984 term).
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sample and the en bane cases is astounding, as the dissent rate increases
more than ten-fold to seventy-five percent. Thus, when a panel member
dissents, the panel's ruling is much more likely to be reheard en banc
than when the panel is unanimous.
Table 6. Relationship Between Unanimous Panel
and En Banc Rehearing
PANEL MAJORITY VOTE ROW
Unanimous Dissent TOTAL
Reheard En Banc 76 229 305
No Rehearing 569 41 610
COLUMN TOTAL 645 270 915
* X2 = 456.81, df= 1, p < .001.
Results for the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits are consistent with
Ginsburg and Falk's study of D.C. Circuit en bane decisions for the 1987
through 1990 terms. 9' In their study, dissents from panel decisions were
also rare-only eleven percent of published panel decisions were
divided. In contrast, panel decisions reheard en banc were divided in
sixty-eight percent of the cases. The probability of the D.C. Circuit
rehearing a unanimous panel decision was one-half of one percent
compared to nine percent for divided panels.9 2
7. Limiting Influence of Designated and/or Senior Judges
Circuit courts frequently rely on visiting judges to assist in the
resolution of cases, but do not appear more likely to grant en banc
rehearing to panels with a visiting judge. One, in a few instances two,
designated judges participated in nearly one-third (31%) of the panels in
the random sample; but, the difference between the participation rate in
panels reheard en bane and those not reheard en bane is small (5%) and
not statistically significant as reflected in Table 7(a). Despite the
perception of some judges and commentators that the involvement of
designated judges alone increases the likelihood of en banc
191. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 16, at 1046-47.
192. Id.
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reconsideration, 93 the evidence from the Second, Fourth, and Eighth
Circuits does not support that conclusion."
Table 7(a). Relationship Between Designated Judge on Panel
and En Banc Rehearing
DESIGNATED JUDGES ROW
None One or More 95  TOTAL
ReheardEn Banc 195 110 305
No Rehearing 419 191 610
COLUMNTOTAL 614 301 915
x2  2.09, df= 1, N.S. (not significant).
The reason for the nonsignificant result may be simple: designated
judges are unlikely to disagree with circuit judges and even less likely to
express that disagreement in a written opinion (majority or dissenting).
Designated judges participated in 110 panel decisions reheard en banc by
the three circuits. Seventy-two of those panels were divided. The
designated judge dissented in only seven of the seventy-two divided
193. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 2, at 595-96.
194. But, other studies have found some evidence for the proposition that cases involving
designated judges are more likely to be reviewed en bane. Justin Green, in a study of the influence of
visiting judges on circuit law, examined 297 cases in which a designated judge wrote the majority
opinion and a circuit judge dissented and compared those cases to a random sample of unanimous
decisions by panels comprised of circuit judges. He found a higher rate of en bane review for the
former group. Saphire & Solimine, supra note 166, at 373-74 (citing Justin J. Green, The Influence
on Circuit Law of Judges Sitting "By Designation," 5-6 (paper delivered at Annual Meeting of
American Political Science Ass'n, Sept. 2, 1979)). Similarly, in an article considering the
phenomenon of visiting judges, Solimine reexamined the cases giving rise to en bane review that
were the basis of his earlier study and found nearly 29% involved a designated district judge, a much
higher rate than the rate of such participation in panels as a whole. Saphire & Solimine, supra note
166, at 374-75. I also found some evidence to support this hypothesis in Ginsburg and Falk's
appendix presenting information about panels reheard en bane by the D.C. Circuit for fiscal years
1981 through 1991 (the authors do not consider the panel participation of non-active judges as a
relevant factor in the en bane process). Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 16, at 1056-91. The D.C.
Circuit granted en bane review to 42 panels during this period. A senior and/or designated judge
participated in 35 of the panel rulings. A seniorjudge participated in 21 cases (one-half of the panels
reviewed en bane), and a designated judge participated in 20 cases (nearly 48%). Six cases were
decided by a panel whose majority was comprised of non-active judges, as one designated judge and
one senior judge sat on the panel.
195. Two designated judges participated in a small number of cases (10) included in this study.
The Second Circuit cases included one reheard en bane and three that were not reheard. The Fourth
Circuit cases included one reheard en bane and five not reheard. There was no relationship between
designated judges comprising a majority of the panel and the decision to grant en bane review.
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cases and wrote the majority opinion in only eighteen of the seventy
cases with an authored majority opinion. Designated judges participated
in 191 panel decisions not reheard en bane in the random sample. Of
those cases, a panelist dissented in twelve. A designated judge wrote the
dissent in only two cases and the majority opinion in only four.
If senior judges and designated judges are considered together, then
non-active panelists appear to increase the likelihood of en bane review.
A majority of a circuit will more often grant en bane review to panels
with non-active judges, and the relationship between the number of non-
active judges and rehearing en bane is statistically significant as reflected
in Table 7(b).
Table 7(b). Relationship Between Non-Active Judge(s) on Panel
and En Banc Rehearing
SENIOR and/or DESIGNATED JUDGES ROW
None One Two Three TOTAL
Reheard En Banc 90 166 49 0 305
No Rehearing 249 306 52 361
COLUMN TOTAL 339 472 101 391
- X2 = 19.1, df = 3, p <.001.
C. Multivariate Test of an Integrated Model of the Decision to Grant
En Banc Rehearing
While the descriptive statistics are very promising (that is, most of the
hypotheses appear to have some support in the data), those statistics
cannot alone provide an explanation for the role of each factor in the
decision to grant en bane rehearing.' 96 Thus, this section sets forth
logistic regression analysis in order to discover the relative influence of
each particular variable on the decision to grant en banc rehearing by
subjugating the individual variables (i.e., the panel characteristics) to
multivariate controls.'97 The results should shed more light on the
reasons that the circuit court uses its en banc power.
196. Karl Llewellyn admonished students of the courts to utilize the best empirical techniques
when he opined: "I do not like coarse analysis and coarse results when more refined analysis and
results are available." Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 516 (1960).
197. The resulting model has as its dependent variable the grant of en banc rehearing and as its
independent variables the legal, attitudinal, and hierarchical factors.
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1. Statistical Method
I have proposed a single integrated model of the decision to grant en
banc review,198 but present three forms or versions of that model because
of the interrelationship between some of the hypotheses. For example,
the ideological direction of the panel's ruling is highly correlated with
the panel's composition, so one model cannot include both these
variables because the interaction between the two variables would skew
the results. Similarly, a panel's composition necessarily correlates highly
with the number of designated judges on the panel, so those two
variables cannot be tested together. Finally, the variables "liberal ruling"
and "outlier ruling" necessarily strongly relate to each other because they
are derived from the same figure-the direction of the panel's ruling-so
one must test them separately. As a result of these constraints, this
section tests three configurations of the integrated model, as set forth in
the table below as Models I, II, and III.'
MODEL
Independent variables I II HI
Legal Theory Intercircuit conflict " " "
Outlier ideology "
Attitudinal Liberal ruling
Theory Outlier majority "
Reversal " / "
Hierarchical Dissenting panelist " - "
Theory Non-active judges " "
Number of cases (N) 779 890 650
198. In testing the integrated model, I am seeking to explain the decision to rehear a panel
decision en banc. This is the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the phenomena I seek to
explain and I think is influenced, affected, or caused by some other phenomenon known as
independent variables. The dependent variable here is a binary variable equal to 0 if the panel is not
reheard en banc, and I if it is reheard. I seek to explain the dependent variable by looking at the
delineated panel characteristics, which are the independent variables. The independent variables (or
explanatory variables) are the factors I believe cause variation in the dependent variable. I am
seeking to test whether there is a relationship between the dependent variable and the independent
variables and, if so, to estimate the strength of that relationship.
199. These multivariate models (models with multiple independent variables) hypothesize that the
presence of the indicated factors (independent variables) causes variation in the grant of en ban6
rehearing (the dependent variable).
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The three model formulations are tested against different quantities of
cases. Model I tests cases decided during periods when the court had an
ideological majority and coded for ideological direction (N = 779 cases).
The data had to be restricted to such cases to test the outlier ideology
hypothesis because in an evenly divided circuit court there are no
mainstreamers or outliers. Model II includes all cases coded for
ideological direction without regard for the circuit's composition
(N = 890 cases). Finally, Model III tests a subset of the Model I cases.
The additional restriction includes the requirement that the panel also
must have an ideological majority (N = 650 cases). None of the models
includes intracircuit conflict as a variable because the statistical test
utilized (logit) cannot estimate the effect of an independent variable that
has no variation with respect to one of the outcomes."° Intracircuit
conflict was not cited in any of the panels not reheard en banc, thus logit
cannot estimate the impact of intracircuit conflict on the decision to grant
en banc review.'O
Each model is tested using the parameter estimation strategy of logit
(a logistic regression method).2 2 One uses logit, a variation of the more
200. J. Scott Long, Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables 59
(1997).
201. A logit model containing an independent variable with no variation with respect to one value
of the binary dependent variable will not converge when estimating the coefficient of that variable.
In essence, the computer program (here, SAS) crashes because whenever the dependent variable
equals 0 (not reheard en banc), the intracircuit variable is also 0 (no intracircuit conflict cited). Id.
202. Logit fits a logistic regression model for binary response data by the method of maximum
likelihood. A multiple logistic regression model takes the form:
logit (it) = (log (dl - it)) = a + f31XI +.. . + PkXk.
See Agresti & Finlay, supra note 182, at 483, 486-92 (discussing logit models for categorical
independent variables), 488-92 (discussing study of effects of racial characteristics of defendant and
of victim on decision to impose death penalty after defendant was convicted of homicide); Long,
supra note 200, at ch. 3 (explaining models appropriate for binary dependent variables); Segal &
Spaeth, supra note 124, at 370-72 (discussing logit model).
I use logit (a logistic regression method) instead of the more traditional linear regression
probability model because underlying assumptions of that model are not satisfied. As an initial
matter, linear regression assumes a linear relationship exists between an increase in the independent
variable and an increase in the dependent variable and such is not the case where we are talking
about the probability of an event occurring (i.e., the likelihood of a court voting for en banc
rehearing of a panel ruling). Also, linear models predict values of the dependent variable in the
whole range of numbers (negative infinity to infinity) instead of the restricted range for dichotomous
variables of 0 or 1. Logit solves these problems by using an S-shaped (as opposed to a linear)
probability function. It is called "logit" because it is formulated in terms of the log of the odds ratio.
See Agresti & Finlay, supra note 182, at 489; Segal & Spaeth, supra note 124, at 368-69 (discussing
why linear regression poses mathematical problems when used to estimate relationships where
dependent variable is dichotomous (has only two values)).
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familiar statistical technique of linear regression, when the observed
event, or dependent variable, is restricted to two values (typically the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of the observed event)." 3 Because the
dependent variable in the integrated model is restricted to two values
(either the panel was reheard en bane or it was not), logit is the
appropriate statistical technique to utilize to test the model. Logit
produces a formula that predicts the probability of the occurrence of the
observed event (e.g., the grant of en banc rehearing) as a function of the
independent variables (i.e., the panel characteristics). 2"
The coefficients estimated by maximum likelihood (MLE) reflect the
strength and direction of the relationship between the independent
variables and the dependent variable.0 5 A variable's MLE represents the
change in the likelihood that a panel will be reheard en banc when the
variable is present. A positive MLE for a given variable indicates that the
presence of that variable (that is, a particular panel characteristic)
increases the probability of a panel being reheard en banc. The
significance level for the variable (indicated in the column headed "Sig
(p < x)") discloses the probability that the MLEs could have occurred by
chance. For example, a significance level of .01 (p < .01) indicates that
there is less than a one percent chance that the independent variable has
no effect on the dependent variable (that is, the decision to grant en bane
rehearing).
Logit poses its own interpretive problems as the coefficients cannot be as readily interpreted (as in
a linear model) because they refer to the log scale. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 124, at 370. In
addition, the problem of serial correlation has proven to be "untractable" in logit. See George &
Epstein, supra note 106, at 335 n.21 (quoting John H. Aldrich & Forrest D. Nelson, Linear
Probability, Logit, and Probit Models 81 (1984)).
203. See David C. Nixon, Appendix B: Probit and Logit, in Contemplating Courts, supra note 27,
at 430, 430. In this excellent introduction to logistic regression methods, Nixon explains that "[a]
great many political variables are discrete: an event either happens or it doesn't; we either observe a
characteristic or we don't. Probit and logit models are common statistical tools for analyzing such
discrete (or dichotomous) dependent variables--outcomes that can take on only one of two possible
values." Id.
204. Id. (explaining that "[i]t is easiest to understand and interpret the probit and logit models by
focusing on the probabilities of observing these discrete dependent variables.... [W]hat are the
chances of observing one outcome rather than the other?").
205. Agresti & Finlay, supra note 182, at 489.
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2. Three Configurations of an Integrated Model of the Decision to
Grant En Banc Rehearing
Three configurations of the integrated model, Models I, II, and III, are
tested. Each model is tested against a slightly different dataset, depending
on the case characteristics included in the model.
a. Model I
The first version of the integrated model (Model I) includes the legal
variable "intercircuit conflict," all hierarchical variables, and the
attitudinal variable "outlier ideology," which reflects whether the
ideological direction of the panel's decision is contrary to the court's
majority ideological position. As you will recall, attitudinal theory
predicts that judges seek to maximize their personal policy preferences
such that a Republican-appointee majority will be more likely to vote to
rehear liberal panel rulings. Model I tests that prediction.
Model I performs well. It correctly classifies 87% of en banc grants.
Model I reduces error by 62.9%.o6
206. One way to evaluate the strength of a model is to consider whether the model improves on
simply guessing the outcome. A guess that each panel in the Model I sample was not reheard en
banc would be correct 68% of the time. The reduction of error number captures that idea by
comparing the model's percentage correct to the modal category (here, the percentage of cases not
reheard en banc). The reduction of error (ROE) is calculated as follows: ROE = 100 x (% correctly
classified - % in the modal category)/(100% - % in the modal category). George & Epstein, supra
note 106, at 335 n.20.
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Logistic Regression of Model I
Independent Variables (panel attributes) MLE S.E. Sig (p < x)
Intercircuit Conflict 0.54 0.50 N.S.
Outlier Ideology 0.50 0.23 .03
Reversal of Lower Court or Agency 1.26 0.23 .0001
Dissenting Panelist 3.66 0.24 .0001
Non-Active Judges 0.67 0.17 .0001
Constant -3.28 0.27 --
-2 Log Likelihood 462.78 p = .0001
• N= 779.
" The dependent variable is whether the case was reheard en banc for all cases
categorized for direction where the circuit court had an ideological majority. The
model is calculating the-probability of a given panel being reheard en banc.
" Of the 779 cases, 272, or 35%, were reheard en bane.
" The model correctly classified 87.0%.
" MiLE = maximum likelihood estimate for the parameter; S.E. = standard error,
Sig = significance levels, N.S. = not significant.
As the hierarchical theory predicts, violation of court norms positively
affects the court's propensity to rehear the case en banc. The prediction
that the violation of the affirmation norm (a reversal) will increase the
probability of en banc rehearing is correct. The reversal variable is
statistically significant at the .0001 level. The odds that a panel ruling
will be reheard en banc are estimated to be 3.52 times higher when the
panel reverses than when the panel affirms the lower court.
Hierarchy theory also produced the hypothesis that judges vote to
grant en banc review when they can easily learn of a breach of their
relational contract with a panel. I suggested that the court would be more
likely to rehear a case en banc if a panelist dissented from the ruling.
When a panelist dissents, it results in a 3.66 standard deviation addition
to the cumulative normal probability function. The dissenting panelist
variable is the strongest contributing factor to the explanatory power of
the model. The odds that a divided panel will be reheard en banc are
38.85 times higher than the odds for a unanimous panel.
The final hierarchical hypothesis-that panels with non-active judges
will be more likely to be reheard en banc-is also proven to be true. The
non-active judges variable is statistically significant, although its
contribution to the explanatory value of the model is weak as compared
to the other hierarchical variables. Similarly, the outlier ideology
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variable, although statistically significant, does not contribute much to
the model's explanatory power.
The legal hypothesis is the only variable that does not find support in
the data. The presence of an intercircuit conflict does not have a
statistically significant impact on a court's decision to rehear a panel
ruling en banc. The variable does not provide any additional explanation
for the decision to grant en banc review on top of that already provided
by the other variables. °7
Finally, the combined effects of the variables are significant as
reflected in the -2 Log Likelihood of p = .0001. Generally, larger values
of the -2 Log Likelihood statistic for the same dataset indicate greater
explanatory value.
b. Model HI
Model II includes all of the legal and hierarchical factors in Model I
but considers the "liberal ruling" variable instead of the "outlier
ideology" variable. This alternative model is also very strong. It correctly
predicts more than 87% of the en banc grants and produces a reduction in
error of 62.2%.
207. I determined this by removing the two variables from the model, reestimating it, and
comparing the log-likelihood ratio it produced with that listed in the Model I table. Overall, the
removal of those variables did not result in a significant reduction in the model's explanatory power.
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Logistic Regression of Model II
Independent Variables (panel MLE S.E. Sig (p < x)
attributes)
Intercircuit Conflict 0.81 0.48 N.S.
Liberal Ruling 1.15 0.24 .0001
Reversal of Lower Court or Agency 0.77 0.23 .001
Dissenting Panelist 3.58 0.23 .0001
Non-Active Judges 0.49 0.16 .002
Constant -3.32 0.24 -
-2 Log Likelihood 522.36 p = .0001
* N= 890.
• The dependent variable is whether the case was reheard en banc for all cases
categorized for direction. The model is calculating the probability of a given panel
being reheard en bane.
" Of the 890 cases, 288, or 32%, were reheard en banc.
" The model correctly classified 87.9%.
" MLE = maximum likelihood estimate for the parameter; S.E. = standard error;
Sig = significance levels, N.S. = not significant, - = not applicable.
In general, the maximum likelihood estimates for the second version
of the integrated model (Model II) meet the expectations set forth
previously. The prediction that a liberal ruling will increase the probability
of en bane rehearing is correct. The variable is statistically significant
and contributes a 1.15 standard deviation addition to the cumulative
normal probability function. A liberal panel ruling is approximately three
times more likely to be reheard en banc than a conservative ruling. The
other variables remain stable as seen by comparing the two tables.
c. Model III
The third version of the model (Model III) varies the previous
versions by changing the attitudinal variable and eliminating the non-
active judges variable. Model III tests the outlier majority variable which
reflects the ideological composition of the panel as measured by the
party of the President who appointed the circuit judges on the panel. If a
majority of the panelists were judges from the circuit minority (e.g., two
or more Democratic appointees to the circuit when the circuit is
dominated by Republican appointees), then the panel was coded as
having an outlier majority.
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Logistic Regression of Model III
Independent Variables (panel attributes) MLE S.E. Sig (p < x)
Intercircuit Conflict 0.66 0.55 N.S.
Outlier Majority 0.33 0.27 N.S.
Reversal of Lower Court or Agency 1.25 0.25 .0001
Dissenting Panelist 3.72 0.27 .0001
Constant -2.70 0.22 --
-2 Log Likelihood 374.16 P=.0001
" N= 650.
" The dependent variable is whether the case was reheard en banc for all cases
categorized for direction where the circuit court had an ideological majority and
the panel also had an ideological majority. The model is calculating the
probability of a given panel being reheard en banc.
o Of the 650 cases, 217, or 33%, were reheard en banc.
" The model correctly classified 88.0% of the cases.
o MLE = maximum likelihood estimate for parameter; S.E. = standard error;
Sig = significance level, N.S. = not significant, -- = not applicable.
Model III is a very strong model, correctly classifying 88% of the en
banc grants and producing a reduction in error of 63.6%. Interestingly,
though, outlier majority is not a statistically significant variable. It does
contribute to the model's overall explanatory power, however.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The integrated model of the decision to grant en banc review explains
a sizeable percentage of the grants of en banc rehearing and provides a
valuable aid to our understanding of how appellate judges exercise
discretion. The empirical results should assist litigators in deciding
whether to file a suggestion for rehearing en banc, contribute to the
debate about the value of the en banc procedure, and reveal a great deal
about judicial behavior. The following are some of the practical
implications for litigators, normative implications for the judiciary, and
positive implications for judicial process scholars.
A. Practical Implications for Litigators
In a market where clients are seeking to contain litigation expenses
and in a legal setting where courts are discouraging en banc suggestions,
lawyers should think carefully before filing a request for en banc
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consideration. Lawyers, of course, should continue to argue when
appropriate that an intracircuit or intercircuit conflict necessitates en
banc rehearing, but they should not anticipate that such an argument will
succeed on its own. They should instead look to panel characteristics
found to be relevant here.
For a lawyer seeking an en banc rehearing, a dissenting panelist
represents the single most helpful factor. Three-quarters of the en banc
rehearings in this study (229 out of 305 cases) followed a divided panel
decision; in contrast, fewer than one in twelve panel decisions not
reheard en banc were divided. In all of the model configurations, the
dissent variable was the leading determinant of the grant of en banc
rehearing."' The odds of a panel decision being reheard en banc are
nearly forty times higher when a panelist dissents than when the panel is
unanimous. Two other factors also contributed strongly to the model:
liberal ruling and reversal of the lower court or agency. Half of the
panels reheard en banc issued liberal reversals compared to fewer than
one-sixth of the panels not reheard en banc. Of the seventy-six
unanimous panels reheard en banc, forty-seven reversed a lower court's
liberal decision.0 9 Using the Model II parameter estimates, the predicted
probability of a divided panel that issues a liberal reversal being reheard
en banc is nearly ninety percent.
Conventional wisdom among appellate lawyers is that a panel's
composition is also a significant determinant of whether the full court
will grant rehearing en banc. For example, a lawyer handed a defeat by a
panel with two Republican appointees will look at the circuit's
composition in evaluating whether a suggestion for en banc rehearing
may succeed. The lawyer may assume that her odds are much more
favorable if the circuit is dominated by Democratic appointees rather
than Republican appointees. The intuition behind this conclusion is
appealing. Litigators typically reason that colleagues with similar
ideological positions will defer to each other's panel decisions, but do
not feel the same deference (and may in fact feel some suspicion) toward
colleagues with whom they disagree. The evidence, however, does not
support this belief. The fact that a panel had an outlier majority did not
significantly influence the courts' decisions to grant en banc review; in
208. The finding that a divided panel greatly increased the odds of en bane rehearing was highly
statistically significant (the probability that this finding is the product of chance is less than one in
10,000).
209. Of the 305 panels reheard en bane, only 14 were unanimous, conservative affirmances.
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fact, slightly more panels not reheard en bane had an outlier majority
than panels reheard en banc (28.2% compared with 26.7%).
B. Normative Implications for the Judiciary
Courts of appeals appear to be conservative and passive institutions
that affirm the status quo and act as a whole only when a dissenting panel
member signals them to do so. Courts of appeals may be coping with
burgeoning caseloads by allowing panels to act essentially unreviewed.
The notion, expressed by the Supreme Court in Textile Mills, that the
"court of appeals" was the entire body of circuit judges may be an
artifact of an era of fewer cases and judges; yet, that notion has been
central to the delegation of substantial lawmaking authority to the circuit
court level. The courts of appeals will lose their legitimacy if they do not
appear to control the integrity of circuit law. The results of this study
could be used to argue that courts must introduce more active methods of
monitoring the decisions of panels to ensure consistency and uniformity
of the law and to maintain meaningful authority as the final word in the
run of federal cases.
This study also can support a very different view of the management
strategy employed by circuit courts. The courts of appeals are most likely
to grant en bane review if a panelist dissents or if the panel disagrees
with the lower court or agency. If all of the judges (or decisionniakers)
who have heard a dispute agree as to its resolution (that is, a unanimous
panel affirms the lower court or agency), then the circuit court defers to
their decision. The courts of appeals, then, are choosing to utilize scarce
resources to rehear cases en banc only when there is some express
disagreement between the judges who have considered the case. Such a
strategy is arguably a wise one given growing caseloads and limited
judicial resources.
C. Positive Implications for Judicial Process Scholars
Studies of the judicial process traditionally set forth a preferred
paradigm and build an argument upon it."' ° They rarely look to or
incorporate other studies, but rather seek to displace or "beat" other
approaches. I do not conceive of the various theories of judicial
210. See Gibson, supra note 102, at 8 (observing that "research that integrates various theories [of
judicial behavior] is much too rare" and arguing "for the integration of alternative theoretical
approaches to judicial decision making").
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decisionmaking as competitive, but rather as complementary.21" ' No
single approach can encompass the complexity of the process by which
judges make decisions. Hence, the overarching implication of my work
for judicial process scholarship is that we should seek to integrate
multiple perspectives into a broader, richer understanding of judicial
behavior.212
V. CONCLUSION
This Article began by asking why the Fourth Circuit decided to rehear
a minor contract interpretation case such as Hardester but not O'Connor,
a case involving a significant intercircuit conflict. We can now answer
that question by considering two factors found relevant in the tests of the
hybrid theory, namely a dissenting panelist and a reversal of the lower
court. The Hardester panel was divided, while the O'Connor panel was
unanimous. The Hardester panel reversed the lower court, while the
O'Connor panel affirmed the lower court. Both panels reached a
conservative conclusion. Thus, O'Connor did not have any of the
characteristics found to be significant to the decision to grant en bane
review, although it did have one characteristic-intercircuit conflict-
traditionally believed to be relevant but which was shown not to be a
strong factor.
The hybrid theory also explains why the Fourth Circuit refused to
grant rehearing en bane to the highly publicized VMI case, United States
v. Virginia, while granting rehearing to a civil suit of no particular note.
The VMI case involved a matter of import and wide applicability and
thus may have seemed to be a likely candidate for en bane rehearing.
Yet, the hybrid theory would have predicted correctly that the VMI case
would not be reheard en bane because the panel was unanimous, the
panel largely agreed with the lower court, and the outcome was
conservative. The hybrid theory would have predicted that the seemingly
unimportant civil suit was a likely candidate for en bane rehearing
because it was decided by a divided panel that reversed the lower court.
The Supreme Court is, as a technical matter, the ultimate authority on
constitutional and federal law; but, as a practical matter the courts of
211. See generally George, supra note 104; George & Epstein, supra note 106.
212. Segal, Songer, and Cameron made a similar point when they argued that "the hierarchical
model-viewing lower-court judges as value driven, as in the attitudinal model, but constrained by
institutional rules and procedures from the free exercise of those values-hints at a productive way
to move the theoretical debate." Segal et al., supra note 125, at 244.
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appeals serve this role. Yet, courts of appeals decide cases in a manner
that most would challenge if adopted by the Supreme Court, namely,
simultaneous divisional sittings of three judges. I proffered at the outset
of this Article that we may accept the panel practice in courts of appeals
because en banc procedures allow the full court to regulate and restrain
panels. In fact, the full court does seem to utilize the en banc mechanism
to check panel rulings out of line with the court's position, but only when
the full court learns of a deviation. Courts of appeals appear to be
affected by the monitoring and information asymmetry problems that
plague many hierarchical organizations. Whether these problems will
undermine the panel practice remains to be seen. Studies such as this one
seeking to explain how judges make decisions will aid in the resolution
of that question and others regarding the judicial system.
